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SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND STRUCTURE OF
EVIDENCE RULES UNDER THE COMMON LAW SYSTEM
AND THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM OF "FREE PROOF"
IN THE GERMAN CODE OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE*
KALH. KUNERT*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Q NEformula
of the most widespread cliches of comparative evidence law is the glib
that, while the Anglo-American evidence law is a well-organized
body of ready-to-hand rules containing the crystallized wisdom of many generations of judges, devised and well-fitted to protect the jury from dubious, misleading or inflaming evidence and the litigant parties from the arbitrariness of the
individual judge, the modern civil law system of free proof is "no system at
all," or, at best, a system where "the judge's discretion largely determines what
evidence is to be used,"' or, even worse, where only "the examining judge ...
decides what witnesses shall be summoned." 2 Looked at from closer quarters,
of course, some qualifications that leap to the eye prove this clich6 to be a grave
fallacy, conceived by those "who do not wish to be confronted with the confused
picture of what is actually going on." 3
* References in this article are to the edition of the code (translated into English
by Horst Niebler) in 10 American Series of Foreign Penal Codes, Germany (1965). The
code is hereinafter cited as C.C.P.
** Dr. iur., Bonn University, 1958. Judge for life, Circuit Court, Essen, and instructor
of junior lawyers (Referendare), since 1963. Lecturer on Law, Bonn University, since 1961.
Visiting Scholar, Harvard Law School, 1965-1966. Author of Die normativen Merkmale
der strafrechtlichen Tatbestlinde (Berlin 1958), Prinzipien der Beweiswiirdigung und
Umfang der Beweisaufnahme in deutschen und nordamerikanischen Straf- und Zivilprozessrecht (forthcoming), and articles and book reviews in legal periodicals.
1. Wigmore, Evidence (student ed.) at 3, 4.
2. Committee on Supreme Court Practice and Procedure, Final Report, (presented by
the Lord High Chancellor to Parliament, 1953) 84, 86 [quoted from Maguire, Weinstein,
Chadbourn & Mansfield, Cases on Evidence at 3 (5th ed. 1965)].
3. Arnold, The Symbols of Government 53 (1962).
Add the labels "inquisitorial" and "accusatorial" to the respective systems of criminal
procedure, and the ready-made and reach-me-down result of this type of comparative
evaluation of legal systems is complete. As to the heuristic value of such classifications,
perhaps it should give us pause that Yale Kamisar [Equal Justice in the Gatchouses and
Mansions of American Criminal Procedure, in Kamisar, Inbau & Arnold, Criminal Justice
in Our Time 1-95 (1965)] calls the prevailing American system of criminal procedure
with its heavy reliance on interrogations and confessions an "inquisitorial" system. On the
other hand, Justice Frankfurter, in Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949) lists the
characteristics of an "accusatorial" as opposed to the "inquisitorial" (viz., Continental)
system of criminal procedure. It is easy to point out, at every item, the respective provisions
of the German Criminal Procedure Code of 1877, as it stands in 1966, that meet the requirements of Justice Frankfurter's definition [The references to the C.C.P. are given in
brackets]: "The requirement of specific charges [§§ 200, 201, 202], their proof beyond a
reasonable doubt [§ 261], the protection of the accused from confessions extorted through
whatever form of police pressures [§§ 136, 136a, 163a C.C.P. and § 343 German Penal Code],
the right to a prompt hearing before a magistrate (§§ 115, 115a], the right to assistance of
counsel [§§ 163a, 169], to be supplied by government when circumstances make it necessary
[§§ 140-146], the duty to advise an accused of his constitutional rights [§§ 136, 163a]these are all characteristics of the accusatorial system and manifestations of its demands."
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What then does go on? No more and no less than that the two systems of
evidence law, though starting from entirely different points, have approached
each other to a very large extent, technicalities omitted. This has resulted from
the abandonment of dogmatic and ideological basic notions and the acceptance
of a more practical and common-sense view.
II.

THE

TWo

PHASES OF THE PROOF PROCESS: RECONSTRUCTION
AND EVALUATION

The mental process that, in a judicial or a comparable proceeding aimed
at fact-finding, leads from uncertainty about a given proposition to a workable
certainty supplying the basis for a subsequent decision, is customarily given
one comprehensive name: PROOF. Verbally, we say, the contested facts are
PROVED. Yet this seemingly uniform mental process involves two distinctly
separate phases.
First, the fact (or facts) to be proved are normally related to an event or
state of affairs in the past or, if in the present, not otherwise the object of the
fact-finder's immediate perception (e.g., the height above sea level of Mount
Everest is at issue). This fact must therefore be reconstructed for and before
the fact-finder. This construction of the replica of the fact in issue-the hearing
of the evidence-is the first phase of the proof process as a whole. As a matter
of fact, several conflicting replicas will normally emerge in a controversial case.
Secondly, to have this replica or model of the fact in issue-or a variety of
replicas, for that matter-set up in the courtroom does not yet create the workable certainty that is needed to arrive at a decision. To reach such a decision,
the replica, or one of the various replicas presented, or a combination of parts
thereof, has to be accepted as truly representing the original fact. For it is the
original fact, after all, that is to be determinative. The second phase of the
process consists of the evaluation of the replica[s] with a view to its judicial
acceptance as a true reconstruction of the original fact. If the evaluation results
in an affirmative answer as to one of the replicas, the fact it represents is considered as proved, i.e., to be or to have been congruent or coinciding with the
replica. If the answer is a negative one with respect to all the replicas, the
determinative fact has not been established. The basis for the decision is then
artificially supplied by the rules concerning the burden of proof.
The evaluation can be either free or fixed, or at least guided, by certain
rules. The general jury verdict under American law4 is, in actual practice, an
extreme example of the first type, since it does not set forth which facts were
found, let alone how and why they were found, and is thereby not open to any
localization of error in the reasoning process that led to the finding of the
ultimate fact. The ancient Continental system of "legal proof" (preuve ligale,
gesetzliche Beweistheorie) where the evaluation by the fact-finder was governed
by strict rules attributing certain quantities of weight to any given evidentiary
4. Cf. Sunderland, Verdicts, General and Special, 29 Yale LJ. 253 (1920); Frank, J.,
in Skidmore v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 167 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1948).
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item,5 was an extreme example of the latter type. Modem German evidence law8
qualifies the principle of free evaluation by the requirement that the court
opinion set forth in some detail not only all single facts that were found but also
all inferences leading from one fact to another and the final combination of
facts (Beweiswiirdigung).7 This requirement of a detailed Beweiswiirdigung in
the written opinion opens the door to an appeal (Revision) based on the alleged
violation of rules of logic or experience or of the laws of nature, 8 and, in
critical cases, even on the allegation that a particular inference, though logically
possible, violated the laws of probability. 9
In American law, the jury's free-wheeling evaluation of the evidence, whose
results cannot be broken up into its constituent parts, is sought to be guided
in advance by judicial instructions to the jury, cautioning them to consider
certain evidence data for special purposes only (e.g., prior inconsistent statements only for impeachment purposes but not for substantive purposes), to take
into account the existence of a presumption, etc.
The problem posed in both systems by these corollaries to the freedom in
the evaluation is the same: How can it be ascertained whether or not the jury
did follow the instructions, or how can it be ascertained whether or not the
written opinion really and truthfully describes the mental process by which
the result was reached, instead of rationalizing it?
In any event, some sort of evaluation-whether by abstract or individualized standards, whether controllable or not-is necessary to connect the fact
replica with the judicial decision, with a view to which the replica was after all
made: the decision-maker must accept one fact replica as true before he acts
upon it.
Now the result of the evaluation obviously depends upon its object, that
is, the evidentiary material evaluated. Hence, the congruence between the real
fact in issue and its reflection in the mind of the decision-maker is likely to be
the more complete, and the final judicial decision therefore likely to be the more
5. Infra, p. 144.
6. A classical analysis of the problems involved may be found in Von Savigny's
memorandum Die Prinzipien in Beziehung auf eine nene Strajprozessordnung (1846), published in 6 Archiv fUr Preussisches Strafrecht [Goltdammer's Archiv] 481-491 (1858).
7. By § 286 of the German Code of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessordnung) this is required for civil cases without any restriction; see Egon Schneider, Die Beweiswilrdigung im
Zivilprozess, 1966 Monatsschrift fUr Deutsches Recht 192 passim, 385. The letter of the
corresponding section in the C.C.P. (§ 267) provides this requirement only for circumstantial proof, but it has been the long-established practice of the trial courts to extend
this provision to all cases, and the higher courts have increasingly reversed judgments
where, in exceptional cases, the trial court did not follow this practice. See Bundesgerichtshof, Judgment of October 16, 1964, in 1965 Goltdammer's Archiv fUr Strafrecht
109; Wenzel, Das Fehlen der Beweisgriinde in; Strafurteil als .Revisionsgrund, 1966 Neue

Juristische Wochenschrift [hereinafter cited N.J.W.1 577.

8. See Sarstedt, Die Revision in Strafsachen [hereinafter cited Sarstedt] 212-31 (4th
ed. 1962); Schwinge, Grundlagen des Revisionsrechts 186-203 (2d ed. 1960).

9. Oberlandesgericht Hamm, Judgment of July 1, 1965-2 Ss 602/65-(not published):
trial court's finding that buyer of stolen automobile was deceived since he did not suspect
vehicle was stolen, "improbable" under the circumstances of the case (low price, buyer, as
operator of filling-station, likely to be familiar with market situation); judgment reversed.
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appropriate to the true case, the more accurately and comprehensively the
reproduction in court represents the true facts of the case. In order to secure
the desirable accuracy and comprehensiveness of the reproduction, the common
law and the civil law systems have developed two entirely different devices: the
adversary system on the one hand and the clarifying duty of the judge, as
expressed, for instance, in section 244(2), C.C.P., on the other hand. Section
244(2) reads as follows: "In order to explore the truth the court shall on its
own motion extend the reception of the evidence to all facts and to all means
of proof which are important for the decision."
The adversary system is recommended because "the best way for a court
to discover the facts in a suit is to have each side strive as hard as it can, in a
keenly partisan spirit, to bring to the court's attention the evidence favorable
to that side," or because "when two men argue, as unfairly as possible, on
opposite sides,... it is certain that no important consideration will altogether
escape notice." 10
The active clarifying function of the judge under the Continental procedural systems is often labeled as the typical "inquisitorial" feature as opposed
to the "accusatorial" nature of the proceedings under the adversary system.
I should therefore like to emphasize right away that section 244(2), C.C.P.,
does not by any means exclude, restrict or replace the right and the obligation
of the parties to introduce relevant evidence or to ask any question pertinent to
the case of any witness or expert witness. 1 Indeed a motion to receive evidence
filed by either of the parties-provided only that the evidence is logically
relevant-must normally be granted, and it is only in a few carefully listed
cases that the judge can refuse to receive evidence thus moved for. Moreover,
he can never refuse to receive relevant evidence that was adduced by the party
itself.'2
The main function of section 244(2), C.C.P., is now to make sure that
where the parties failed to indicate-in the charge sheet, in formal motions to
receive evidence, or in informal suggestions to the court-or to themselves adduce, under section 245, C.C.P., all pertinent evidence, the trial judge has to
step in and to assume the role of defense or state counsel, respectively. He does
this not as a partisan of either party but as a partisan only of the truthadducing, on his own motion, all accessible evidence that may have a tendency
to clarify the case in either way. As a matter of fact, section 244(2), C.C.P.,
makes the everyday duty of the German trial judge what, according to Wigmore,
has always been considered as "the inherent and essential power" of the com10. Frank, Courts on Trial 80 (Atheneum ed. 1963); cf. Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility, Association of American Law Schools and the American Bar
Association, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A.J.
1159-64 (1958).
11. See C.C.P. §§ 240, 241; 13 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Strafsachen
[reports of the Bundesgerichtshof in criminal cases, hereinafter cited BGHSt] 252 (1959).
12. Cf. C.C.P. §§ 244(3), 244(4), 245; and infra p. 159.
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mon law judge. This power (though sparsely used) was enjoyed until, in the
United States, the judges were "reduced to the position of mere umpires" that
"sealed their own abdication" by acquiescing to a very passive role.13
It is obvious and logically cogent that the result of the evaluation of the
evidence depends on the admitted evidence as its object. But it is no less true
in both systems that the object, conversely, takes its shape from the principles
that govern its evaluation, particularly from the mental structure of the evaluator-or from what that mental structure is believed to be. This influence that
the principles of the evaluation of the object exercise on the object of the
evaluation itself is perhaps not logically cogent-unless one believes in the
neo-Kantian doctrine that method determines the subject matter-but it is this
influence that has generated the bulk of the rules of evidence germane to either
system, respectively, as I shall point out forthwith.
Under the combined jury and adversary system, with its separation of
powers between judge and jury and the presentation of the evidence by the
litigant parties only, the inherent distinction between the two functions of
determining the scope of the reception of the evidence and of weighing the
admitted evidence becomes enacted on the stage, so to speak, when the jury
retires to deliberate the case in the deliberation room. The jury so far has been
a passive observer of the scene and has had no say in the determination of the
object now submitted to their evaluation. Under the old inquisitorial system on
the Continent a comparable distribution of functions did not exist at all, since
the investigating judge and the trial judge were identical, and the rules that
regulated the admission of evidence and those regulating its weight were closely
interwoven. Under the modern accusatorial system, introduced after the 1848
revolutions in the German states, the trial judge's function has become entirely
separated from the investigatory and the accusatory functions, and the trial
judge has become entirely emancipated from the old proof rules. Yet the personal union between the conductor of the trial and the free evaluator of the
evidence has created serious misunderstandings and confusions between the
principles governing the two phases of the proof process, as we shall see later.'
III.

CHANGING NOTIONS OF THE JUROR'S MIND-CHANGING EVIDENCE RULES

A. Traditional Exclusionary Rules
Pure reasoning leads to the conclusion that the results of the proof-taking

process must be best-in the sense of congruence with truth-if its two phases
are at their best. And the two phases are at their best if the most accurate,
reliable and comprehensive mass of evidentiary data, in short, all logically
relevant data obtainable on the controversial facts, are appraised and weighed
by the most critical, conscientious, considerate, well-trained, and painstaking
13. 1 Wigmore, Evidence [hereinafter cited Wigmorel § 3c, at 285 (3d ed. 1940);
9 Wigmore § 2484.
14. Infra, p. 155.
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mind. Now it is widely conceded that the evidence admitted under the traditional Anglo-American evidence rules does not meet the first requirement. Instead, "the generally accepted rules of evidence [exclude] . . . much evidence
of real and substantial probative value . . . on considerations irrelevant to its
probative weight but relevant to possible misunderstanding or misuse by the
jury,"' and "they limit, absurdly, the courtroom quest for the truth. The
result, often, is a gravely false picture of the actual fact."'16 In less iconoclastic
language one of the most distinguished American evidence scholars expresses
the same idea: Maguire17 warns us of the
false assumption-namely, that in a trial all evidence which is relevant,
which has a logical tendency to establish one way or another the
contested issues of fact, is going to be admitted for consideration of
the trier of fact. Instead, the real truth is that courts and legislatures,
most particularly in these United States, have over the years made up
many rules for excluding from trials a great deal of relevant evidence.
Operating these rules has kept judges and lawyers and law professors
so fully occupied that they have not yet satisfactorily explored the important questions of evidential cogency. They have been too busy
deciding what should be kept out to make, much less teach, systematic
appraisal of what they let in. So... evidence has to do with exclusion
rather than evaluation.
Dean Wigmore passed this verdict on the traditional exclusionary rules:
"They serve, not as needful tools for helping the truth at trials, but as gamerules, afterwards, for setting aside the verdict.' 8 And the draftsmen of the
American Law Institute's Model Code of Evidence found them "so defective
that instead of being the means of developing truth, they operate to suppress
it.,j,9
'The exclusionary rules that are mainly responsible for this result, since
they are by far the most numerous and far-reaching, are those of "auxiliary
probative value," 20 to use Wigmore's classification, namely, the hearsay rule,
the opinion rule, the best evidence rule, and the character rule. It is these rules
that distinguish Anglo-American evidence law from its Continental counterpart,
not the "rules of extrinsic policy," 2' comprising, e.g., the various privilege rules,
and the rules excluding illegally obtained evidence, irrespective of its probative
value. The differences with respect to the latter group of rules are of no basic
but rather of an accidental nature (e.g., under German evidence law, not only
the spouse of the accused, but also the fianc6e and certain relations of the third
degree are entitled to refuse testimony).22
15. Mr. Justice Rutledge in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 173 (1949).
16. Frank, op. cit. supra note 10, at 123.
17. Evidence-Common Sense and Common Law 10 (1947).
18. 1 Wigmore § Sc.
19. ALI, Model Code of Evidence, Introduction at viii (1942).
20. 4 Wigmore § 1171 passim.
21. 8 Wigmore § 2175 passim. On the role of these rules in German evidence law,
see infra, p. 149.
22. C.C.P. § 52; cf. Code of Civil Procedure § 383.
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Of course, the exclusionary rules of probative policy are deeply rooted in
the jury system. "These rules are aimed at guarding the jury from the overweening effect of certain kinds of evidence. The whole fabric is kept together
by that purpose. The rules are supposed to enshrine that purpose."23 Similarly,
Lord Coleridge, in Wright v. Tatham,2 4 called it a "fallacy" to believe "that
whatever is morally convincing and whatever reasonable beings would form
their judgments and act upon, may be submitted to a jury."
The frailty of jurors' minds is also responsible for the exclusion of inflammatory, gruesome or, eventually, too appealing evidence. 25 Likewise, the
authentication rules are put down to a jury's tendency to jump to the conclusion
that because a writing offered by a party purports to be of a certain authorship
does indeed prove the authorship.2 6 The application of the authentication rule
resulted in the direction of a verdict for the defendant in a recent case 27
where the plaintiff brought action against a canned food manufacturer for
damages alleging that the defendant had negligently prepared, manufactured,
packed and distributed a can of peas which contained a sharp piece of metal
concealed in the peas, and that the plaintiff while eating them swallowed the
piece of metal, which lodged in her throat. The label encircling the can that was
alleged to have contained the peas was excluded because, naturally, the plaintiff
had no possibility to authenticate it.
Cn a jury really not be trusted to take into consideration the possibility
that the label was falsified and to reject this possibility if, as it happened in
the case, the defendant does not offer the slightest evidence to that effect?
Thus, it is the structure of the jury's mind-an element belonging to the
evaluation phase-that gives rise to hard and fast rules for the reproduction
phase. Through the application of these rules the case may then be disposed of
altogether without its ever reaching the mind that is supposed to find the facts.
The structure of the jury's mind-what do we know about that phenomenon? Has anyone ever X-rayed it? Do judges communicate with jurors so that
they get an idea of what goes on in their minds? Do jurors ever tell? Indeed,
can they? If we knew what test jurors number one to two thousand thought or
felt about a particular group of evidentiary items, 28 would that be a reliable
basis to conclude that these twelve men and women in the jury box would even
now and then think or feel the same way? What then did judges rely upon
23. 1 Wigmore § Sa, at 250.
24. 5 Clark & F. 670, 690, 7 Eng. Rep. 559, 566 (H,. 1838).
25. In Radosh v. Shipstad, 17 A.D.2d 660, 230 N.Y.S.2d 295 (2d Dep't 1962), a breach
of contract case where the defendant claimed that plaintiff, a professional skater, had
weighed too much to perform, the court felt that the jury was distracted from the issue of
her prior weight by having her appear in court in her skating costume.
26. 7 Wigmore § 2130.
27. Keegan v. Green Giant Co., 150 Me. 283, 110 A.2d 599 (1954).
28. Cf. Kalven, Report on the jury Project, Conference on Aims and Methods of
Legal Research (ed. Conard 1955). Jeremy Bentham deplored the lack of any such experience on the part of the judges and warned against their "rash suspicion" that "if the
jury were suffered to hear [certain evidence], they would be sure to be deceived by it."
3 Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence 553 (". S. Mill ed. 1827).
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when they created exclusionary rules shaped to the minds of jurors? Was it
throughout what Erskine, arguing against the admission of an unauthenticated
document purported it to be, namely, "great wisdom, in that which ... forms
the glory of the English law in all its parts, in an acquaintance with the human
character, in the recognition of all that belongs to the principles of the human
mind, in the recollection of our wise ancestors that men are not angels, that
they carry about them... all the infirmities of humanity.. .,,?29 Or is it sometimes rather an educated guess or rather the guess of educated men whereby the
jury's mind becomes what educated and sophisticated men believe a juror's mind
to be?
According to the judges' wisdom or their guesses, then, the jury's mind
must combine some conflicting features that seem somewhat difficult to reconcile
with each other. Sometimes, the exclusionary rules of probative policy seem
to presuppose a jury composed of what Professor Morgan called "a group of
low-grade morons. 3 0° On the other hand, the jury is supposed to be capable
of and indeed is carefully instructed to perform intellectual differentiations and
a mind-splitting that would do honor to the most sophisticated self-analyst.
According to the judges' notion of the jury's mind, jurors are capable to
disregard any incompetent evidence that slipped in inadvertently or that was
admitted conditionally and not "connected up" properly,31 or to disregard
outside32 information prejudicial to the defendant that, since prejudicial, would
be inadmissible in evidence. 33 And "where an attorney in argument travels outside the record to import matters calculated to inflame the passions and prejudices of a jury, his opponent should request and the court should give an
instruction directing the jury to disregard such appeals.13 4 Are passions and
prejudices, once aroused, switched off so easily?
According to the judges' notion, the jury has the mental capacity, where
evidence of prior convictions or of bad reputation for truth and veracity is
introduced to impeach the credibility of the defendant who took the stand, to
let the bad character evidenced by those prior convictions or bad reputation
influence only their estimate of the credibility of his testimony. But at the same
time the jury is not to be influenced by this impeaching evidence in its consideration of whether or not the defendant committed the offense in issue. Jurors,
in short, are supposed to be able to use such evidence "for impeaching purposes
only," but not "substantively." But what is supposed to go on in the mind of
a juror who, as a result of the impeachment use, comes to the conclusion that
29. Home Took's Trial, 25 How. St. Tr. 1, 78 (Eng. 1794).
30. Morgan, Some Problems of Proof Under the Anglo-American System of Litigation 105 (1956).
31. 1 Wigmore § 14; see also White v. United States, 279 F.2d 740 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 850 (1960).
32. E.g., newspaper or other news media.
33. Cf. Marshal v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959); United States v. Accardo,
298 F.2d 133 (7th Cir. 1962) (newspaper information).
34. Busch, Law and Tactics in Jury Trials § 564 (1949) (collecting cases).
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the defendant is untrustworthy, and who then has to weigh the contention of
the untrustworthy defendant that he is innocent? If he follows the judge's instructions conscientiously he must at that stage forget that the defendant has
been shown to be untrustworthy. For to remember it would mean to realize
that this man is untrustworthy when he claims to be innocent, and to realize
this would be making "substantive use" of the proven untrustworthiness, which
would be illegitimate.3 5
In the lawyer's eyes the jury will be equally capable to distinguish between
impeachment use and substantive use of prior inconsistent statements of a witness or a party.36 This task is assumed to be possible even if these prior inconsistent statements were contained in a coerced-but possibly true-confession
not substantively usable as such due to the coercion involved.3 7 Again, the
juror, after having heard W's testimony as to fact A and X's testimony that W
had previously stated non-A may use this testimony to doubt or even disbelieve W's present testimony as to A, but he must not use it to believe that
non-A is true. But if only A or non-A can be true, what other than substantive
use can the jury make of this statement containing non-A if they-legitimatelydisbelieve A? If A is not true, then non-A must be true.
The same difficulty of discrimination can be found in United States v.
Klass,38 a prosecution for selling a house at more than the authorized maximum
price. The defendants denied having received excess payments on other house
sales; three other witnesses contradicted these denials. If, on the basis of this
testimony, one disbelieves the defendants as to the prior sales, and therefrom
deduces that, since they once lied on the same issue, their present testimony
is also to be disbelieved, the only alternative is that they did overcharge in
the case at bar. In other words: the impeaching effect supplied by proof of a
previous lie has been used directly for the substantive proof of the present
charge.
Do jurors' minds operate in a way that permits the distinction required by
the judge's instructions to make no substantive use of the prior inconsistent
statements or the statements of the impeaching witnesses?
According to the law's image of the jury's mind, the jury can further
be credited with what Morgan calls "a super-human ability"39 in joint trials
where the confession of one of several defendants is introduced and where the
35. E.g., in State v. Ternan, 32 Wash. 2d 584, 203 P.2d 342 (1949), the Supreme Court
of Washington stated that the trial judge "excluded from the minds of jurors the idea that
they might consider such evidence [of a bad reputation for truth and veracity] in
determining whether the appellants were guilty of any offense." Id. at 591, 203 P.2d
at 346. Dean Griswold, 51 A.B.A.J. 1021 (1965) calls it a "self-deception" to make these
distinctions. Cf. 1 Wigmore § 194; McCormick, Evidence [hereinafter cited McCormick]
94 (1954).
36. For an intricate situation of this kind, see United States v. Reinecke, 354 F.2d
418 (2d Cir. 1965).
37. State v. Turnbow, 67 N.M. 241, 248-55, 354 P.2d 533, 538-43 (1960).
38. 166 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1948).
39. Morgan, op. cit. supra note 30, at 105.
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jurors are supposed to be able to think of the confession against one defendant
only but to dismiss it from their minds when considering the guilt or innocence
of the other defendants. Some recent cases that we shall discuss shortly 40 seem
to acknowledge that Judge Frank was right when he called the taking for
granted of this ability "unmitigated fiction, '41 a statement to which Justice
42
Frankfurter expressly subscribed.
B. Reliability of the Factual Representation
Since the result of the first phase of the proof-taking process (that is, the
evidence that goes to the jury for their evaluation) is the product of admissibility rules that are based on such diverging and conflicting notions of the
jury's mind, we may well have to face the possibility that the replica of the facts
thus presented is indeed often "gravely false." The replica produced in court
is the reflection of the notions that created the rules governing its production,
and thus its ratio to the true facts must be similar to the ratio of those notions
to the true structure of the fact-finder's mind. That is, it must of necessity be
a picture of which we cannot say whether it is true, any more than we can
say whether the image of the jury's mind that we apply is true. And this all the
more so, the more general and unmitigated by exceptions and individualizations
the rules are, because the diversity and the possible falsity of the basic notions
are then reflected to their fullest extent, without any corrections by taking into
consideration the individual features of the case. If we imagine for one moment
that there were no exceptions to the hearsay rule at all because the frailty of
jurors was believed to be too great altogether to allow for any-what would the
fact replica that could go to the jury for their evaluation look like? Of course,
there are numerous exceptions to the hearsay rule as to other exclusionary rules,
but the net result seems to be that the evidentiary material admitted for the
consideration of the trier of fact still falls short, to a substantial extent, of
the ideal that Thayer proclaimed more than half a century ago and that Morgan
and Maguire, looking backward and forward at evidence, made their own: that
"(1) nothing is to be received which is not logically probative of some matter
requiring to be proved; and (2) everything which is thus probative should come
43
in, unless a clear ground of policy or law excludes it."1
Now let us place ourselves in the role of a law enforcement officer or prosecutor who realizes that the evidence he has gotten so far or that he thinks he
can possibly get will be partly inadmissible according to those rules, or that,
at best, to establish his case by "evidence independently secured through skillful
40. See in!ra, pp. 133-38.
41. United States v. Dell Paoli, 229 F.2d 319, 323 (2d Cir.) (dissenting opinion),
aff'd, 352 U.S. 232 (1957).
42. Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 248 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
43. Morgan and Maguire, Looking Backward and Forwardat Evidence, 50 Harv. L.
Rev. 909, 922-923 (1937).
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investigation" 44 will be extremely difficult. Will not his natural reaction be to
look for a confession or for hearsay evidence of an out-of-court confession? With
these-provided that the confession is proper, of course-he will not only get
over the admissibility hurdle but he is also most likely to get a conviction since
nothing is more persuasive than a confession. Experienced prosecutors speak of
the sigh of relief in the jury box when in a critical case evidence of a confession
is put forth.
The theory is therefore submitted, with deference, that the function of
the exclusionary rules to exclude substantial portions of relevant (and also
constitutional) evidence on grounds of jury protection must have greatly contributed to the emphasis on confessions (and admissions as well) that still
characterizes American evidence law in theory and practice. As to confessions,
a recent note,45 covering almost two hundred pages, though omitting the concededly "major field" of confessions used at joint trials,4 0 is a documentation
of the great concern of American jurisprudence with this problem. And Dean
Griswold in his article dealing with "The Long View" on American criminal
procedure, 47 seems to be less confident than his students that the practical
problems involved here have been largely solved.
The second contributory factor in this direction, it is further submitted,
must be the requirement of unanimity of the jury verdict, a requirement that
has not been mitigated in criminal cases. Unanimity of a jury of twelve laymen
is certainly easier to reach on the basis of a confession than on the basis of an
array of indicia in circumstantial evidence, since the former has the seductive
"persuasiveness of apparent conclusiveness." 4
If these theses are accepted, it follows again that it is the structure of the
juror's mind that determines the scope of the presentation phase and the shape
of the replica of the relevant facts of the case.
In the German criminal procedure of the twentieth century-with the exception of the Nazi period, when extortion of confessions by most brutal methods was
rampant chiefly in political cases-and particularly in these last twenty years,
there is no counterpart, neither on the factual nor on the legal level, to the
expansive discussion of confession problems in this country. According to the
theories developed here, the fact that this goes along with the virtual absence
of the jury system and of strict exclusionary rules of probative policy as well as
with the absence of a unanimity requirement would be not merely accidental,
but indicative of the viability of the theory that confessions serve to build up
parts of the fact replica that otherwise would not come in at all as a result of
the exclusionary rules.
44.
without
45.
46.

Watts v. Indiana, 388 U.S. 49, 54 (1949). ndependently, as used here, means
use of the suspect's own statements.
Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 935-1119 (1966).
Id. at 939 n.10; see also infra, p. 133.

47. 51 A.BA.J. 1018 (1965). This view obviously underlies Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 486 (1966).
48. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 192 (1953).
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But are these parts reliable representations of the represented facts? As to
confessions in criminal cases, the tests for trustworthiness that were developed
in the common law (voluntariness, corroboration, corpus delicti requirement)
are as many guarantees of this reliability. As to admissions in non-criminal cases,
the answer seems to be less reassuring. Seeing that the admissions doctrine
undercuts not only the hearsay rule but also the best evidence rule, the opinion
rule, the firsthand knowledge rule and incompetency rules-so many guarantees
of evidential trustworthiness-and seeing that admissions by "privies in estate"
or adoptive admissions are widely admitted, and all this with hardly another
justification than a somewhat defiant "adversary theory argument" 49 and
"largely without regard to reliability of evidence," 50 one cannot but feel that
admissions serve to a large extent as a substitute rather than as a tool for
finding the truth.
Again, in German civil procedure, there is no counterpart to the elaborate
body of rules dealing with evidential admissions and certainly no counterpart
to the enormous number of pertinent cases. 51
C. The Changing Scope of the Proof-Taking Process
Evidence rules change as the judicial image of the jury's mind changes.
In other words, a changed notion of the jury's mind entails-through changed
evidentiary rules-a change in the scope of the proof-taking process and thereby
a change in the kind of replica of the real facts. This will finally result in a
change in the outcome of the trial of cases. In short, the outcome of cases is
largely determined by the notions-based largely on guesses, fictions, and assumptions-that judges have of the lay fact-finder's mind. This I want to
demonstrate by some instances:
In Stein v. New York5 2 and Jackson v. Denno53 the Supreme Court gave
diametrically opposite answers to the same question, namely, whether the jury
is able to separate the issues of the voluntariness and the truthfulness of a confession. The Stein case upheld the giving of both issues to the trial jury under
limiting instructions, and the Jackson case expressly overruled this aspect of
Stein. The conflicting answers rested entirely on conflicting notions of the
jury's mental capacities. In both cases the jury was at once given the (hearsay)
evidence of a confession, the evidence going to the voluntariness of this con49. Stated by Maguire, Evidence, Common Sense and Common Law 143 (1947) in
these words: "Your own words or other actions have turned out helpful to your adversary;
because you are their author, evidence of them is admissible against you; explain away
the damaging effect if you can."
S0. Id. at 142; cf. McCormick § 239, at 502: "No objective guaranty of trustworthiness is furnished by the admissions-rule."

51. Judicial admissions are dealt with in §§ 288-90 of the Zivilprozessordnung. The
leading commentary by Baumbach refers to evidential admissions only in one phrase,

grouping them among normal indicia; Introduction to § 288 (28th ed. by Lauterbach 1965).
52. 346 U.S. 156 (1953).
53. 378 U.S. 368 (1964). See Paulsen, The Winds of Change: Criminal Procedure
in New York 1941-1965, 15 Buffalo L. Rev. 297, 306-07 (1965).
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fession, and of all the corroborating evidence tending to show that the confession
was true and that the defendant bad committed the crime. This procedure is
known as the "New York Rule." In both cases there was sufficient independent
evidence-apart from the confessions-on which the defendant could reasonably
be found guilty. 4 In both cases the jury was told that if it found the confession
involuntary, it was to disregard it entirely, and to determine guilt or innocence
solely from the other evidence in the case; alternatively, if it found the confession voluntary, it was to determine its truth or reliability and afford it weight
accordingly.
In both cases a general verdict of guilty was returned by the jury, and
thus in both cases it was impossible to discover whether the jury found the
confession voluntary and relied upon it, or involuntary and supposedly ignored
it. The convicted defendants, "being cloaked by the general verdict, ... [did]
not know what result they really [were] attacking.... .",5 In both cases the jury
"[might] have agreed that the confessions were coerced, or at least that the state
had not met the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that they were
voluntary,"5 6 and yet they might have reached the verdict of guilty entirely on
the independent evidence.
The Court in Stein, though aware of "the difficult problems raised by such
jury trial" that "relies heavily on the jury 5 7 in effect did itself rely on the jury.
The Court relied on the jury's capacity to separate the issues of voluntariness
and truthfulness, and to keep their appraisal of the other evidence uninfluenced
by the fact that there was a confession, and their appraisal of the voluntariness
of the confession uninfluenced by the fact that there was "ample other evidence,"r58 which might have had a tendency to assuage lingering doubts as to
the voluntariness. Thus the Court assumed that one of the "hypothetical alternatives," namely, that the jury either admitted and relied on the confession,
or rejected it and convicted on the other evidence, must have been chosen by the
jury. This the Court assumed in the face of the consideration that, perhaps,
the confessions... serve[d] as make-weights in a compromise verdict,
some jurors accepting the confessions to overcome lingering doubts of
guilt, others rejecting them but finding their doubts satisfied by other
evidence, and yet others or perhaps all never reaching a separate and
definite conclusion as to the confessions but returning an unanalytical
and impressionistic verdict based on all they had heard.59
This consideration though is pushed aside by the statement that such a danger
"is inherent in jury trial of any two or more issues, and departure from instruction is a risk inseparable from jury secrecy and independence." 0°
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

346 U.S. at 192; 378 U.S. at 393-95.
346 U.S. at 177; 378 U.S. at 380.
346 U.S. at 177.
Id. at 172, 179.
Id. at 177.

59. Id. at 177-78.
60. Id. at 178-79.
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In Jackson v. Denno the Court called the basic assumption of the Court
in Stein "unsound," 6' citing Professor Morgan who, in turn, named the Stein
Court's belief that the jury could have split their minds sufficiently so as to
follow the trial judge's instruction "pious fictions." Professor Morgan said of
those instructions: "the rule of exclusion ought not to be emasculated by
admitting the evidence and giving to the jury an instruction which, as every
judge and lawyer knows, cannot be obeyed.1 62 Instead, the Jackson Court
pointed out "the dangers to an accused's rights under either of the alternative
assumptions"0 3 of the Stein decision:
The jury, however, may find it difficult to understand the policy
forbidding reliance upon a coerced, but true, confession, a policy which
has divided this Court in the past, see Stein v. New York, supra, and
an issue which may be reargued in the jury room. That a trustworthy
confession must also be voluntary if it is to be used at all, generates
natural and potent pressure to find it voluntary. 64
Indeed, "the danger that matters pertaining to the defendant's guilt will infect
the jury's findings of fact bearing upon voluntariness, as well as its conclusion
upon that issue itself," 65 is so serious, that "under the New York procedure,
the evidence given the jury inevitably injects irrelevant nd impermissible considerations of truthfulness of the confession into the assessment of voluntariness."00 This must invariably lead to an "admixture of reliability and volun67
tariness in the considerations of the jury."
On the other hand, the other alternative hypothesized in Stein-that the
jury found the confession involuntary and disregarded it-is equally rejected:
If it finds the confession involuntary, does the jury-indeed, can
it-then disregard the confession in accordance with its instructions?
If there are lingering doubts about the sufficiency of the other evidence,
does the jury unconsciously lay them to rest by resort to the confession? Will uncertainty about the sufficiency of the other evidence to
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt actually result in acquittal
when the jury knows the defendant has given a truthful confession?6 s
It is clear that the Court's answer to all these rhetorical questions is "No."
The jury, then, in the Jackson Court's opinion is not capable of the mindsplitting that the Stein Court postulated to be possible, and, according to the
Jackson Court, to rely on that capacity was to deprive the defendant of his
constitutional right "to have a fair hearing and a reliable determination on the
issue of voluntariness .... "69 To Mr. Justice Black, dissenting, to permit "this
61. 378 U.S. at 381, 387.
62. Morgan, op. cit. supra note 30, at 104-0.

63. 378 U.S. at 381.

64. Id. at 382 (italics added.).

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 383.
Id. at 386.
Id. at 387.
Id. at 388.
Id. at 377.
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down-grading of trial by jury" is "to challenge the soundness of the Founders'
great faith in jury trials."70 Whether that is so, I dare not say. But anyhow,
the notion of the jury that underlies Jackson is somewhat more skeptical-and
should we not say, more realistic?-than that of the Stein Court and, if Mr.
Justice Black is right, of the Founders. For our purposes it suffices to state that
this new attitude of the Court created a new evidence rule, namely the requirement of separate resolutions of the voluntariness and the truthfulness issues by
separate fact-finders, and the exclusion of the evidence pertaining to the
voluntariness from the convicting jury. This new evidence rule may of course
result in a different outcome of the trial of a case if we only accept the theory
least sceptical of the jury's capacities, namely, that the question of reliance
on a coerced but true confession could be reargued in the jury room.
In Delli Paoli v. United States71 and People v. Aranda72 the written confession of one of several co-defendants was admitted in evidence at a joint trial
under the confessions exception from the hearsay rule. In both cases, another
co-defendant who had not confessed was alleged in the confession to have been
involved in the crime as a conspirator, and his name was not deleted from the
confession when it was read to the jury. In both cases, the confession was
admissible only against the confessor and inadmissible against the co-defendant.
Accordingly, the trial judge instructed the jury to consider it only against the
confessor but to exclude it from their determination of the guilt or innocence
of the non-confessing co-defendant. In both cases the issue was whether these
instructions to the jury provided the non-confessor with sufficient protection,
that is, "whether it was reasonably possible for the jury to follow them.1173 The
4 answered the question in the affirmative, stating
Supreme Court in Delli PaoliH
"that possible prejudice against other defendants may be overcome by clear
instructions limiting the jury's consideration of a post-conspiracy declaration
solely to the determination of the guilt of the declarant," and that it was
reasonably possible for the jury to make the required distinctions:
It is a basic premise of our jury system that the court states the
law to the jury and that the jury applies that law to the facts as the
jury finds them. Unless we proceed on the basis that the jury will follow the court's instructions where those instructions are clear and the
be expected to
circumstances are such that the jury can reasonably
7
follow them, the jury system makes little sense. 6
The majority not only trusted that the jury endeavored to follow the
Court's instructions, but also that they managed to do so.
In his dissent, Mr. Justice Frankfurter disputed this very faculty:
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 405.
352 U.S. 232 (1957).
63 Cal. 2d 518, 407 P.2d 265, 47 Cal. Rptr. 353 (1965).
352 U.S. at 239.

Ibid.

Id. at 242.
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The fact of the matter is that too often such admonition against misuse is intrinsically ineffective in that the effect of such a nonadmissible
declaration cannot be wiped from the brains of the jurors. The admonition therefore becomes a futile collocation of words and fails of
its purpose as a legal protection to defendants against whom such a
declaration should not tell ....
The government should not have the
windfall of having the jury be influenced by evidence against a defendant which, as a matter of law, they should not consider but which
they cannot put out of their minds.76
Judge Frank with whose dissent, below, Justice Frankfurter expressly agreed,
had stated his belief that "the cautionary admonition had no effect on the
jury" and that "the naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome
by instructions to the jury . . . all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated
77
fiction."
In People v. Aranda this view was shared by the California Supreme Court.
The California court maintained that "a jury cannot segregate evidence into
separate intellectual boxes," that to expect this from the jury was charging them
with an "overwhelming task," and that the result of leaving this psychologically
impossible mind-splitting to the jury was inevitably "prejudicial and unfair to
the nondeclarant defendant" and must be avoided by either a severance of trials
or complete deletion of the co-defendant's name from the confession.8 The California court's arguments are largely drawn from Jackson v. Denno:
Although Jackson was directly concerned with obviating any risk
that a jury might rely on an unconstitutionally obtained confession
in determining the defendant's guilt, its logic extends to obviating the
risks that the jury may rely on any inadmissible statements. If it is a
denial of due process to rely on a jury's presumed ability to disregard
an involuntary confession, it may also be a denial of due process to rely
on a jury's presumed ability to disregard a co-defendant's confession
implicating another defendant when it is determining that defendant's
guilt or innocenceY9
Again, it is the judge's image of the jury's mind that determines the evidence rules and thereby the mode and scope of the hearing of evidence, and
the outcome of a case may well depend on the judge's estimate of the functioning
of the jury's mind. But the trend is clearly away from the dogmatic and
mechanical notions and toward a more realistic and psychologically more viable
notion.
A very similar trend can be discerned in recent cases that are concerned
with the question of substantive or mere impeachment use of prior inconsistent
statements. Whereas Dean Wigmore, in the third edition of his treatise on
evidence still stated the "orthodox view"--which he attacked vehemently76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 247, 248.
United States v. Dell Paoli, 229 F.2d 319, 323 (2d Cir. 1957).
63 Cal. 2d 518, at -, 407 P.2d 265, at 271, 272, 47 Cal. Rptr. 353, at 359, 360.
Id. at -, 407 P.2d at 271, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
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"that prior self-contradictions are not to be treated as having any substantive
or independent testimonial value,"80 but could be used for impeachment purposes only, as "universally maintained by the courts," the situation today is
greatly different. Not only do both the Model Evidence Code of the American
Law Institute"' and the Uniform Rules of Evidence8 2 provide for the use of prior
inconsistent statements as substantive evidence, but the courts, too, have begun
on a wide front to reject the notion of the juror who can "segregate evidence
into separate intellectual boxes" and to replace it by a more realistic view.
In 1962, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit said in Asaro v.
Parisi, "One can hardly expect jurors, however conscientious, to perform the
mental gymnastic of distinguishing between using a witness's prior statement
for testimonial purposes and using it only to contradict. The orthodox rule is
not realistic.1 83 In 1964, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
described that expectation as a "pious fraud," "artificial," "basically misguided,"
"a mere verbal ritual," and "an anachronism that still impedes our pursuit of
the truth." That court expressed its view of a juror's capacity to put on
schizophrenia in this language:
To tell a jury it may consider the prior testimony as reflecting
on the veracity of the later denial of relevant knowledge but not as
the substantive evidence that alone would be pertinent is a demand
for mental gymnastics of which jurors are happily incapable. Beyond
that the
this, the orthodox view defies the dictate of common sense
4
fresher the memory, the fuller and more accurate it 1S.8
Whether this liberal view that may result in the conviction of a defendant
on an unsworn, out-of-court statement of a witness runs counter to the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment,8 5 since the witness, though now
available for cross-examination, was not so when he made the prior statement,
is a question that cannot be decided here. Suffice it to state here that the court
opinions cited above hinged only on a particular and, it seems, psychologically
realistic and convincing notion of a lay fact-finder's mind.
D. Inferences From "State of Mind" Testimony

If the judges' notions as to how a jury will react to certain evidentiary data
are largely based on guesses and surmises, there is one thing that we can be
fairly certain of: jurors are human beings and therefore in all probability
capable of logical reasoning. Sunt, ergo cogitant. Therefore, a jury could follow
this chain of inferences (all possible but not compelling) in deciding whether
D, now unavailable, was in Crooked City on a certain day: W testified on the
80. 4 Wigmore § 1018(b).
81. Rule 503 (1942).
82. Rule 63(1) (1953).

83. 297 F.2d 859, 864, (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 904 (1962).
84. United States v. DeSisto, 329 F.2d 929 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 979 (1964).
85. See Note, Preserving the Right to Confrontation-A New Approachl o Hearsay

Evidence in Criminal Trials, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 741 (1965).
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stand that D told him he planned to go to Crooked City on the day in issue.
From this testimony, it can be inferred that D did have that plan in mind.
From this state of D's mind, it can be inferred that he did go there, since plans
have a tendency to be carried out and that there is no reason why D should not
have carried out his plan. Therefore, D was there on the day in issue.
Under the landmark decision in Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hillmon,86
this use of D's declaration is not a hearsay use, since from the point where the
fact-finder takes D's state of mind (plan) for granted (D may have been lying
about his intention), he proceeds on an entirely inferential path. In other words,
the gap between D's state of mind (as testified to by W) and the fact to be
proved (that D was in Crooked City) is bridged by the juror's reliance on his
own reasoning, not by his reliance on the testimonial qualities of D. He would
have to rely on those testimonial qualities if, instead, W had testified that D
had told him that he had gone to Crooked City on a previous day, i.e., a day
in the latter case, the testimony
prior to the narration of the trip. Therefore,
87
hearsay.
inadmissible
be
would
of D
What do we mean by saying that in the latter case the fact-finder would
have to rely on D's testimonial capacity? In order to reach the result that D
went, the fact-finder would have to proceed from D's state of mind (this being
taken as established) along these lines: D believed he went. He believed so because he went and because he remembered that he went.
The fact-finder, then, in the first case is trusted to be able to perform, inferentially, the gap-bridging from the state of mind of the declarant to the fact
related to that state of mind, by interjecting into the reasoning process the result
of the everyday common sense experience that plans, intentions, or motives have
a tendency to be realized. He is also trusted to be sufficiently aware of the
equally generally known fact that often enough people do not carry out their
plans or intentions or do not act according to their motives. To be sufficiently
aware, that is, to be able to weigh the cogency of the inference "A planned X,
ergo A did X," and to eventually reject this inference. In short, the jury is
trusted to be able to perform a rational operation of some intricacy and is yet
given the responsibility to discharge this duty. Its capacity for reasoning and
weighing arguments is indeed greatly relied upon when an out-of-court statement
of a declarant's state of mind is to be used inferentially to cast light on the
time subsequent to that state of mind.
But what if the declarant's state of mind is to cast light on an event in the
past instead of an event in the future, if for instance, his memory of his own
conduct or of an observation of facts is to be used to cast light on that conduct
86.

145 U.S. 285 (1892); see the discussion of this case in 1 Wigmore §§ 102-13 and

McCormick § 270.

87. Cf. Uniform Rules of Evidence 63(12): [No hearsay involved in evidence of
the out-of-court statement] "of the declarant's (a) then existing state of mind, emotion

or physical sensation, including statements of intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling,
. . . but not including memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed. ...
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or other fact? E.g., W testifies that D told him that he went to Crooked City.8 8
The functional role of the experience that plans have a tendency to be carried
out is here taken by the more neutral but no less common experience that memories or beliefs are sometimes true and sometimes false. And before the factfinder can assess whether the fact in issue is true (did D go?), he must decide
whether he thinks the memory of the declarant to be true, that is, congruent
with the facts, just as, in the former case, he had to decide whether the plan
was indeed carried out. The greater neutrality of memory in comparison with
plan and intention is undeniable, but equally undeniable is the fact that every
man or woman in his or her senses is aware of this. Will not this awareness lead
him or her to attribute less weight or cogency to the out-of-court statement of
memory or belief? Cannot this awareness be trusted to balance the closer relation between plan and fact as opposed to memory and fact? Analytically, the
affirmative answer seems to be inevitable, as was pointed out, as early as 1912,
by Seligman.8 9 As a matter of fact, it is rejected by the courts. The Supreme
Court, when faced with this question gave this answer:
The ruling in [the Hilknon] case marks the high-water line beyond which courts have been unwilling to go. . . .Declarations of
intention, casting light upon the future, have been sharply distinguished from declarations of memory, pointing backwards to the past.
There would be an end, or nearly that, to the rule against hearsay if
the distinction were ignored. 0
This is an argument that draws its force entirely from the axiomatic fact
of the existence of the hearsay rule whose "odor of sanctity" 9' 1 forestalls further
questioning. Further questioning of the principle is forestalled, it is true, but
not its gradual undermining. In one group of cases evidence of memory or
belief to prove the fact remembered or believed, that is, evidence of a state of
mind to cast light into the past, is increasingly received in the face of the
Shepard doctrine: in wills cases, 92 evidence of the testator's declarations that
he has or has not made a will, or a will of a particular purport, or has or has
not revoked his will, is admitted. This is true even though it must be conceded
that in no small number of instances a testator may tell lies about the contents
of a will in order to deceive his fellow men. Volpone is an exception in dimension, but not so much in essence. The conscientious fact-finder who realizes this
-and indeed a jury, in a case like that, is expected to realize it-must therefore
certainly weigh the deceased's declaration very carefully before he proceeds to
the assessment of the facts stated therein.
88. Let us remember that as far as our reliance on the declarant's truthfulness in
expressing his state of mind is concerned, we are now in the same situation as in the first
group of cases; there we assumed that D truthfully stated his plan, here we assume that
he truthfully stated his memory.
89.
90.

An Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 26 Harv. L. Rev. 146, at 156-57 (1912).
Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, at 105-06 (1933).

91. McCormick § 271, at 576.
92. Id. at 577 passim (Collection of cases).
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What can we deduce from these observations?
The notions of the functioning of the juror's mind that stand behind the
state of mind cases are entirely different from the general notions that created
the hearsay rule. No corresponding deep-rooted difference can be detected in
the chain of reasoning which the fact-finder must follow. Both notions stand so
93
far unreconciled in contemporary jurisprudence. Uniform Rule 63(4) (c) ,
though providing-for an enormously wide liberalization of the hearsay rule,94
is not a reconciliation of these conflicting principles, since it is not based on the
analytical observations outlined above, but on the mere pragmatic reasons of
necessity and particular trustworthiness of the declarant's statement as estimated
by the judge. It is only in the practical results that the application of Rule
63 (4) (c) and the analytically determined view would coincide in large regions.
A distinction very similar to that between hearsay use [relying on the
testimonial qualities of the declarant] and circumstantial use [based on the
fact-finder's ability to draw inferences from the declarant's state of mind] is
that made between the exclusion, in principle, of character evidence to prove
the accused's propensity to commit an alleged crime as part of the prosecution's
case-in-chief, 5 and the admission, for the same purpose, of evidence of other
crimes of the accused where this evidence is relevant to show, circumstantially,
the existence of a larger plan, a scheme, motive, malice, deliberation, or other
like crimes by the accused so nearly identical in method as to earmark them as
the handiwork of the accused. 96 If, in the famous "brides of the bath" case,
evidence that the accused had previously drowned two other brides in the bath
in the same manner as that he is now charged with is admitted and given to the
jury for consideration, we rely on the jury's capacity to draw inferences of a
rational character from the previous crimes. We rely as well on their capacity
to resist the temptation to be overwhelmed, in the case at bar, by the fact that
this accused is a "bad man," who ought to be punished for the earlier crimes
anyhow.
E. The Hearsay Rule in German Criminal Procedure
It may be interesting at this point to take a short glance at the development of the hearsay problem in German procedural law. When the system of
"legal proof" 97 was incorporated in the first code of criminal procedure for the
German Reich, 98 the "hearsay witness" (that was obviously also the witness not
speaking from first-hand knowledge) was rejected as being "not sufficient." His
testimony, if received, was not to be considered. Since each evidentiary item was
attributed a particular fraction of weight, this was rather easily accomplished
93. Uniform Rules of Evidence.

94. See the analysis in Chadbourn, Bentham and the Hearsay Rule-A Benthamic
View of Rule 63(4)(c) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 932 (1962).
95. 1 Wigmore §§ 57, 194.

96. 2 Wigmore §§ 300 passim; McCormick § 157.
97. See infra, p. 144.
98. Le., Constitutio Criminalis Carolina (1532).
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without creating an exclusionary rule. 99 In the subsequent codes of the German
states up to the early nineteenth century, we find basically the same provisions. 10 0 All these codes were based on the principle of "legal proof," and
throughout, the hearsay element could be easily eliminated at the evaluation
stage when the weight fractions were put together. When, in the middle of the
nineteenth century, the principle of "free evaluation of the evidence" (freic
Beweiswiirdigung) was introduced' 01 the hearsay problem could not survive as
an admissibility problem, because it had only been considered as an evaluation
problem. Consequently, the solution of the difficulties involved in the hearsay
problem was left entirely to the trier of fact in the particular case. He was
trusted to be able to give to the hearsay evidence whatever weight it, in his
opinion, deserved. This was in accordance with the great trust that the judge
and the jury were given under the principle of free evaluation of the evidence.
Under the C.C.P. for the German Reich of February 1, 1877102 hearsay
is therefore admissible in principle. 10 3 Written hearsay, however, is excluded as
far as depositions are concerned, unless the declarant is dead, out of the country,
or otherwise unavailable. 0 4 Confessions made before a judge and put down to
writing are also admissible'0 5 unless obtained through coercive methods or
trickery.' 0
The theoretical justification for the broad admission of hearsay' 0 7 corresponds exactly to the rationale given by the American courts and writers in the
state of mind cases that we discussed. It is said that the out-of-court statements
of a declarant that are reported by a witness on the stand are as many indicia
for the existence of the facts stated. They are indicia, that is to say, which permit an inferential approach to the facts stated in the same way as any other
indicium, with the only exception that their probative value is often smaller
than that of other indicia. Altogether, a basic difference between inferential or
circumstantial evidence on the one hand and testimonial evidence on the other
hand is not recognized, since reliance on testimonial evidence, too, involves, in
the final analysis, reliance on inferences.'08 These inferences are: that because
the trier of fact heard W say fact X was true, W did say so; that W said so because he believed so; that he believed so because he had had certain sensory
99. See Schoetensack, Der Strafprozess der Carolina 73 (1904), and Art. 66, C.C.C.
100. E.g., Austria, Gesetzbuch ilber Verbrechen und Schwere Polizey-Obertretungen
§ 403 (1803) ; Bavaria, Strafgesetzbuch II, art. 277 (1813); Prussia, Criminalordnung §§ 324,
386 (1805) and Allgemeine Gerichtsordnung §§ 239, 241 (1793).
101. See infra, p. 146.
102. Effective October 1, 1879.
103. See 1 Lwe-Rosenberg, Strafprozessordnung [hereinafter cited LdMwe-Rosenberg]
§ 250, comm. 3, at 1016 (21st ed. 1963) (collecting cases and citing authorities); 1 Eb.
Schmidt, Lehrkommentar zur Strafprozessordnung 263-60 (2d ed. 1964) (analytical discussion).

104. C.C.P. §§ 250-52.
105. C.C.P. § 254.
106. C.C.P. § 136a.

107. Schmidt, op. cit. supra note 103.
108. Engisch, Logische Studien zur Gesetzesanwendung 61-71 (2d ed. 1960).
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impressions; and that he had these sensory impressions because a corresponding
event took place in reality that created these impressions.
All this does not mean that the trial court may content itself with hearing
hearsay evidence in every case. If the court does so, though better evidence is
available, it violates its obligation to clarify the case' 0 9 and the judgment will
invariably be reversed on that ground." 0
These last observations lead us to a broader consideration of the background before which evidence rules must be viewed under the modern system
of German criminal procedure.

IV.

ENFORCING THE ADMIsSION OF EVIDENCE BY "FREE PROOF"

AND EVIDENCE RULES

A. The HistoricalBackground
In German procedure, after the reception of the Romanesque law, the factfinding function became increasingly, and for a long time entirely, the task of
the learned judge.
In modern German criminal procedure there is, it is true, lay participation in virtually every trial court, except for magistrates courts dealing
with petty offenses and for the highest court dealing with some
treason and similar political cases. But the lay judges-either two or
six, and always vested with the power to bring about an acquittal-are
regarded by the law not as a jury in the Anglo-American sense but
rather as a kind of temporary career judges. They deliberate together
with the career judges and, after proper instruction by them, take full
part, with a full vote, in the decision of legal as well as factual questions, and also in the sentencing. The jury system, introduced after
the 1848 revolution, was abolished in 1924.111
The historical predecessors of the modern Continental judiciary were the
law-trained official of the Pope, cardinal or bishop charged to exercise his
master's judicial power, and, after the renaissance of Roman law at the Italian
law schools had produced the "learned" secular lawyer, the crown official
representing the monarch in court. It was only in the late eighteenth and early
ninteenth centuries that the emancipation of the judge from the monarch as his
employer and superior took place, and that the judiciary achieved independence
in terms of appointment for life, irremovability from local office, independence
above all from orders of the monarch. Finally, after World War II, judicial review
every action of the executive and
was established in Germany over virtually
12
legislative branches of government."
109. C.C.P. § 244(2); see infra, p. 160.
110. See note 103, supra, and Sarstedt, 190-93 (4th ed. 1962).
111. See Mannheim, Tial by Jury in Modern Continental Criminal Law, 53 L.Q.
Rev. 99, 388 (1937) (two parts).
112. Schmidt, op. cit. supra note 103, at 260-318; see also Einfllhrung in die
Geschichte der deutschen Strafrechtspflege 273-79, 339-42. For the role of the judiciary see
Grundgesetz fUr die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Art. 19, 92-100 (1949).

143

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
It is therefore in the notion of the judge that we must look for the key to
the understanding of the German evidence law system.
The counterpart of the notion of the judge as a civil servant of the ruler
(a high cleric or, later, a monarch) was the theory and system of "legal proof. '"±a
Rejecting the ancient Roman law doctrine that proof of a fact meant nothing
unless the judge was thoroughly convinced of its existence, that is, rejecting
the idea of a judge vested with an enormous power, the canonist lawyers had
built up by the end of the fifteenth century an elaborate system of rules regulating in subtle detail both the taking and the weighing of evidence. This system
was adopted by the secular courts all over Europe in the early decades of the
sixteenth century and remained in force, with ever-increasing modifications and,
later, liberalizations. In France the system lasted until the French Revolution,
and in Germany, until the middle of the nineteenth century. The system of legal
proof was politically and sociologically inspired by the desire to restrain the
judge's power, which was to be achieved by making him an executor of prescribed
rules rather than the decisive factor in a legal proceeding. Intellectually, it rested
on two pillars: 114 several references in the Bible that "in ore duorum vel trium
testiumr stat omne verum," and on the canonist notion that in criminal matters
a confession was the preferable proof, since it involved not only the greatest
degree of certainty but also warranted the perpetrator's insight and penitence
and was thereby the first step toward his improvement. Thus two witnesses or
a judicial confession constituted "full proof." But the witnesses had to be
"testes classici," that is, fully trustworthy witnesses, and the confession had to
be creditworthy, indeed it had to be corroborated. From these additional requirements which still left an immense amount of discretion to the fact-finder,"d
a host of rules ensued laying down in great detail when witnesses had to be
regarded as "classici," "minus kabiles" (not to be given full credit), or "inhabiles" (incompetent). The group of incompetent witnesses was, by and large,
congruent with the group of witnesses that were incompetent under the common
law up to the middle of the nineteenth century. In addition to parties, near relatives, all persons interested in the outcome of the case, etc., this group comprised
also hearsay witnesses." 6 So, broadly speaking, the basic difference between the
Anglo-American and the Continental systems of evidence by the time of, say,
the coming of the French Revolution, was not the existence or nonexistence
113. For a historical survey see Planck, 4 Kritische Vierteljahresschrift fUr Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft 248 et seq. (1862). For detailed accounts see Endemann, Die
Beweislehre des Zivilprozesses (1860) and Mittermaier, Die Lehre vom Beweise im Deutschen
Strafprozesse (1834). For the development of the doctrine in Canon Law see Gross, Die
Beweistheorie im Canonischen Prozess (1867) and Das Beweisverfahren im Canonischen
Prozess (1880). As to the situation in France, see Esmein, History of Continental Criminal
Procedure 251-271 (1913).
114. Gross, op. cit. supra note 103, at 96, 292.
115. As expressed in, e.g., the Prussian Criminalordnung of 1805 §§ 359, 393, 401,

402; cf. Von Savigny, Die Prinzipien in Beziehung auf eine neue Strafprozessordnung (1846),
published in 6 Archiv fir Preussisches Strafrecht [Goltdammer's Archiv] 481-91 (1858).
116. See supra, p. 141.
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of admissibility rules but the existence or nonexistence of evaluation rules."17
Or, if juries were given evaluation instructions by the judges, the difference
remained that their ineffectiveness could not be discerned in the general verdict
of the jury, whereas in the Continental system the arithmetic of the proof
evaluation by the lower court had to be fully disclosed in that court's opinion
and was open to the review by a higher court. For on the Continent, the evaluation of the evidence under the theory of "legal proof" had become, at least in
theory, an almost entirely arithmetic procedure. The weight of a witness's
testimony was assessed beforehand by abstract rules, according to his belonging
18
to a particular group of persons, as constituting "half" or "quarter" proof.
As to circumstantial evidence," x9 indicia were classified and the necessary number of prospectant, concomitant, and retrospective indicia was set forth in great
detail in the codes.120 Indicia, though, could never constitute "full proof" by
themselves.
It is obvious that all these efforts could never banish judicial discretion
entirely from the evaluating process. The assessment of such qualities as the
trustworthiness of a confession, or the "suspect" character of a witness as being
interested in the outcome of the case, or, above all, the weight of indicia, could
never be assessed beforehand and in abstracto without allowing the judge to
exercise some amount of discretion. It has therefore often been observed'' that
the theory of legal proof existed in books rather than in reality, since it enabled
the judge to apply seemingly all the technical details of the rules in his written
opinion and yet allow his discretion to slip in through the back door, which the
reviewing court could not possibly supervise.
To complete the theoretical picture it remains to be said that the gap between "half" or "more than half" proof (semiplena, plus quam semiplena probatio) and "full" proof was bridged, in criminal procedure, by a confession

(obtained, if necessary, by torture),122 and in civil procedure, by the oath of

123
the party who had established at least "half proof."'

B. "Intime Conviction" Replaces "Legal Proof"

The abolition of the system of "legal proof" that had been much ridiculed
by the writers of the enlightenment period (above all by Voltaire) started, first
117. Mittermaier, op. cit. supra note 113, at 110 passim.
118. One "classic" witness constituted "half proof," for "si duo testes faciunt plenam
probationern, ergo unus semiplenam," as the glossatores reasoned convincingly (Gross,
Beweisverfahren 293, 301 [supra, note 1131). A "suspected" witness constituted "less than
half proof," others were "almost classic" (Cf. Hommel, Catalogus Testium Alphabeticus,
ex Quo Cognoscitur, Qui Testes Plane Inhabiles, Qui Semitestes, Qui Plus Quam Semitestes
et Qui Semitestibus Fide Minores Sint [17801).
119. See Bauer, Die Theorie des Anzeigenbewelses (1843).
120. E.g., Articles 308-30 of the Bavarian Code, cited supra note 100.
121. E.g., by Von Savigny, op. cit. supra note 115.
122. Torture was abolished in France in 1788 and in Germany between 1740 (Prussia)
and 1828 (Gotha); see Esmein, op. cit. supra note 113, at 393-94; Von Kries, Lehrbuch

des deutschen Strafprozessrechts 45-46 (1892).
123. Wetzell, System des ordentlichen Civilprocesses 277 Passim (3d ed. 1878);
Rached, De l'intime conviction du juge 106-08 (1942).
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in France, and sixty years later in Germany, in criminal procedure. It went
along with, and indeed was supposed to be the necessary corollary of, the introduction of the jury system for criminal cases very much along Anglo-American
lines. In France the "legal proof" system was abolished by the law passed by
the Constituent Assembly on September 16, 1791; in Germany the abolition
was accomplished by the "reformed" state codes of the years 18 4 8 -18 51 .12'4
Instead of quantitative rules governing the weight of the evidence, the "intme
conviction," "moral certainty" or "full persuasion" of the jurors and-in nonjury cases-of the judges was to determine guilt or innocence, and later also,
in civil cases, the existence or non-existence of a factual contention to support
a claim.
It must be emphasized here that in German civil procedure (section
286 German Civil Procedure Code) the same principle of full persuasion or persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt governs the evaluation
of the evidence in civil cases as in criminal cases. A differentiation between "preponderance of the evidence" and "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" does not exist in principle. The only difference between
civil and criminal procedure is that in civil procedure a number of
presumptions alleviate the burden of persuasion, whereas in criminal
procedure presumptions against the defendant do not exist.
Article 342 of the Napoleonic Code d'Instruction Criminelle of November
17/27, 1808, expressed the new principle of intime conviction-introduced already by the law of September 16, 1791-in the formulized charge to the jury:
La loi ne demande pas compte aux jurds des moyens par lesquels
ils se sont convaincus; elle ne leur prescrit point de r6gles desquelles
ils doivent faire particuli~rement d6pendre la pl6nitude et la suffisance
d'une preuve: elle leur prescrit de s'interroger eux m6mes dans le
silence et le recueillement, et de chercher, dans la sinc6rit6 de leur conscience, quelle impression ont faite sur leur raison les preuves rapportdes
contre l'accus6, et les moyens de sa d6fense. La loi ne leur dit point:
Vous tiendrez pour vrai tout fait attestM par tel out tel nombre de
timoins; elle ne leur dit pas non plus: Vous ne regarderez pas comme
suffisamment 6tablie, toute preuve qui ne sera pas form~e de tel procsverbal, de telles pices, de tant de tdmoins out de tant dindices; elle ne
leur fait que cette seule question, qui renferme25 toute ]a mesure de
leurs devoirs: Avez-vous une intime conviction?1
The new principle was made applicable also to all proceedings before career
judges alone, that is, before the tribunaux de police and the tribunaux en mati~re correctionnelle.
The criminal procedure codes of the German states that were promulgated
124. Esmein, op. cit. supra note 113, at 408 passirt; 1 Glaser, Hiandbuch des Strafprozesses 162-87 (1883); Schwinge, Der Kampf urn die Schwurgerichte bis zur Frankfurter
Nationalversammlung 74-91 (1926); 1 Holtzendorff, Handbuch des deutschen Strafprozessrechts 65 et seq. (1879).
125. Emphasis in original.
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in the aftermath of the Revolution of 1848 contained very similar provisions. 2 6
But so mesmerized were the proponents of the new principle of the intime
conviction as a substitute for the hated system of legal proof both in France
and in Germany that they were carried away with their enthusiasm. They lost
sight of the interdependencies, in the much-admired Anglo-American jury
system, between (1) the principle of "moral proof," i.e., th1e principle that, once
evidence has been sent to the jury, the individual and total weight of probative
value is to be assessed by the jury alone, with hardly any rules regulating the
weight; (2) the principle of excluding altogether certain relevant evidentiary
data from the jury by exclusionary rules; and (3) the less active but rather
detached role of the judge in the proof-production process. Thus, the jury system
was imported in France, and later in Germany, without the exclusionary evidence rules of probative policy and without the Anglo-American notion of the
role of the judge. Esmein and Faustin H6lie in their comprehensive descriptions 2 7 of the debates in the French Constituent Assembly that resulted in
the law of September 16, 1791, do not refer to a single realization of these interrelationships. And the Code d'Instruction Criminelle of 1808 that became
the model for the "reformed" codes of the German states after the 1848 Revolution certainly does not contain anything faintly resembling Anglo-American
evidence rules of probative policy. Mittermaier, the prominent German evidence
scholar, blamed the French proponents of the jury for not having informed
themselves about these concomitant features of the Anglo-American jury system. 2 8 But by his time, the high-pitched sentiments of the revolutionary
period, when the jury was enthusiastically welcomed as an instrument of
democracy rather than as a vehicle of technical evidence rules, had greatly
subsided. In the meantime there had also arrived, in England and the United
States, what Wigmore has called the "spring-tide" of more and more elaborate
evidence rulings.129 This was mainly due to the increase of printed reports of
nisi prius rulings in the quarter century from 1790 to 1815, so that Mittermaier
had far better access to the cases (and far more leisure to study them) than the
French writers two or three generations earlier.
The French Code of 1808 had also made the presiding judge a very strong
figure. He conducted the proceedings in a way not very much different from
the way the old inquisitiorial judges had operated. His "pouvoir discritionnaire"8 0 included, for instance, not only the right to examine the witnesses
adduced by the parties, but also the right to adduce other witnesses on his own
motion, and the even more important right to reject evidence proffered by the
126.
127.

See Sammlung der neuen deutschen Strafprozessordnungen (ed. Haeberlin 1852).
Id. at 408-26. 4 Faustin HRlie, trait6 de L'instruction criminelle 336-41 (2d ed.

1866).
128. Mittermaier, Erfahrungen iber die Wirksamkeit der Schwurgerichte in Europa
und Amerika 131, 176 (1865).
129. 1 Wigmore § 8, at 238.
130. Art. 268 of the Code.
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parties; 31
in short to "prendre sur lui tout ce qu'il croira utile pour d~couvrir
la v~ritj!" 132
In Germany, Mittermaier, who had carried out extensive comparative
studies, advocated the adoption of the Anglo-American jury system as a whole
in criminal cases, including the evidence rules and the umpire function of the
judge. 133 But his proposals went largely unheeded. One of the reasons undoubtedly was that when the revolutions of 1848 broke out in the German states
and the state governments had to satisfy the strong popular demand for a
"reformed" criminal procedure, 134 there was not enough time to prepare more
than roughly revised copies of the French Code of 1808 and to introduce in a
somewhat precipitated way the politically urgent innovations.",,
The jury system was introduced for political cases and felonies, but not
for petty offenses and misdemeanors. The accusatorial principle, with the requirement of the public prosecutor investigating the case and filing a charge
sheet before the case could reach the trial court, was introduced throughout.
This distinguishes modern German criminal procedure most sharply from the
old inquisitorial system where the investigating judge and the trial judge were
either identical, or where the trial judge adjudicated the case on the basis of
the dossiers of the- investigating judge according to the "legal proof" rules,
without ever having seen the accused face to face. Furthermore, the principles
of publicity, orality, and immediacy were made basic requirements of the
criminal trial; that is, the whole case had to be tried to the judge or panel
that decided the case, and nothing but what had been discussed in open court
could be made a basis for the verdict and the sentence.
But there were more intrinsic reasons for not following Mittermaier's proposals: neither in jury nor in non-jury cases was the career judge's impartiality
regarded to manifest itself in his passivity with respect to the production of the
evidence. But rather, it was considered to be one of his most noble obligations
to elicit exonerating as well as incriminating facts from the accused or the
witness before him, or to call, on his own motion, exonerating witnesses and
expert witnesses. In short he was to "extend the reception of the evidence to
131. Art. 270 reads: "Le president devra rejeter tout ce qui tendrait & prolonger les
d~bats sans donner lieu d'esp~rer plus de certitude dans les r&ultats."
132. Art. 268. Cf. Lacuisine, Traits du puovoir judiciaire dans la direction des d6bats
criminels (1845); Mittermaier, Ober die Stellung des Assisenprisidenlen, 1 Der Gerichtssaal
17, 19 (1849) ; Mittermaier, Erfahrungen (fully cited supra, note 128) at 133, 159.
133. Die gesetzliche Beweistheorie in ihrern Verhiltnis zu Geschwornengerchten, 12
Neuese Archiv des Kriminalrechts 488 (1830); 13 id. 120-40, 280-303 (1832); Die Lehre
vom Beweise 112 (1834); see also note 132, supra.
134. The "prosecutions of the demagogues" [i.e., the liberal politicians] in carrying
out the Karlsbad Resolutions of 1819, the strong weapon of the Restoration, had been one
of the main causes of dissatisfaction with the old criminal procedure. See Schwlnge,
Schwurgerichte (fully cited, note 124, supra) 45.
135. Id. at 156, 158; 1 Glaser, Handbuch (fully cited, note 124, supra) 162; Binding,
Grundriss des Strafprozessrechts 13 (3d ed. 1893). As to the results, see Planck, Systematische
Darstellung des Deutschen Strafverfahrens iv passim (1857). The texts are reprinted in
Haeberlin, op. cit. supra note 125. For the legislative history see Glaser, supra; Holtzendorff,
op. cit. supra note 124, at 65.
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all facts and to all means of proof which are important for the decision." 186
On the other hand, exclusionary rules similar to the Anglo-American evidence
rules of probative policy were deemed to be incompatible with the prevailing
veneration for the newly introduced jury as a body of mature and responsible
citizens, and also with the great trust that the more or less liberal legislatures
of the post-1848 period and of the Reich in 1877 put in the professional judges.
These professional judges, it must be remembered, continued to be the only
responsible fact-finders in petty offenses and misdemeanor trials. The suggestion to grant to the jury the intime conviction principle and to retain the
system of legal proof for the career judges was rejected by the argument that
the judges' independent position, their academic training and their social responsibility certainly called for their equal treatment with jurors. This required
the judges' emancipation from the old evidence rules.
C. Exclusionary Rules of Extrinsic Policy
If for these reasons a body of exclusionary rules of probative policy was
not adopted by the post-1848 state codes nor by the Reich Code of 1877/79,
the body of exclusionary rules of extrinsic policy that we find in the C.C.P. of
1877/79 for the then unified Reich-bypassing now the earlier state codes-is
certainly as large and as elaborate as in the common law jurisdictions. This code
has ever since been enlarged and refined by numerous amendments and judicial
decisions. Here is an exemplary but by no means exhaustive survey: 8 7
(1) According to sections 52-54, C.C.P., the following groups of persons
are entitled to refuse testimony: the person engaged to marry the accused; the
spouse of the accused, even if the marriage no longer exists; whoever is related
directly by blood, marriage or adoption, or collaterally related by blood to the
third degree or by marriage to the second degree, to the accused, even if the
marriage upon which the relationship is based no longer exists; (with regard
to certain professional and confidential communication): clergymen, defense
counsel of the accused, attorneys-at-law, patent attorneys, sworn accountants,
auditors, tax advisers, authorized tax agents, physicians, dentists, pharmacists,
mid-wives, members of Parliament, editors, publishers, printers, producers, and
public officials, unless their superior authorizes them to testify.
Evidence obtained in violation of the invocation of one of the privileges
mentioned above-e.g., even statements made and recorded before the privilege
was invoked or before the ground for the privilege existed-is inadmissible (section 252 C.C.P.); admission constitutes reversible error. There are some rather
controversial exceptions to this rule that cannot be discussed here. 3 8
136. C.C.P. § 244(2); see infra, p. 160.
137. See Alsberg-Niise, Der Beweisantrag im Strafprozess [hereinafter cited AlsbergNUse] 89-107 (2d. 1956).
138. For an example of a statement taken in violation of the privilege, see judgment
of Bayerisches Oberstes Landesgericht, 1966 N.J.W. 117; See also 6 BGHSt 279. The exceptions are discussed in MUller-Sax (KMR), Kommentar zur Strafprozessordnung [herein-
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(2) The privilege against self-incrimination, according to the jurisprudence
of the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal High Court)' 3 9 guaranteed by the broad
provision of the constitution protecting human dignity, is spelled out in several
detailed code provisions. Section 136a, C.C.P., forbids, and section 343, Penal
Code, makes it a felony, to impair the freedom of the accused to determine and
to exercise his will by ill-treatment, by fatigue, by physical interference, by
dispensing medicines, by torture, by deception or by hypnosis, or by threatening him with a measure not permitted by the provisions of the law, or by
promising an advantage not provided by law. These prohibitions apply irrespective of the accused person's consent, and statements obtained in violation of
140
these prohibitions may not be used even if the accused agrees to said use.
Thus the lie-detector and narco-analysis are prohibited even if the accused gives
his consent. All this applies to all stages of the criminal investigation, including
police interrogation. 4 1 Failure to comply with these exclusionary rules vitiates
42
the judgment and inevitably results in reversal on appeal (Revision).1
Any person charged with any offense must be informed, by the police
officer first interrogating him, by the state attorney, by the investigating judge
and by the trial judge, of his "right to respond to the accusation, or not to
answer regarding the charge, and at all times, even before his examination, to
consult with defense counsel of his choice."' 43 The extent to which failure to
give this information to the suspect or the accused vitiates a verdict of guilty
144
based, at least in part, on his own statement, is still a matter of controversy.

This will be one of the chief topics of the
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1966. The

present writer's view is that any failure to give the suspect the information required by sections 136, 163a(3), (4), and 243(3) must be considered as a
"deception" in the meaning of section 136a(1). First, it is clear that a deliberately false information to the effect that the suspect was under a legal obligation to make a statement would be a "deception." The same would be true of a
deliberate omission to give the correct information, for this is the equivalent of
the first case, both in the reprehensibleness on the part of the interrogator and
in the resulting ignorance of the suspect. The remaining question is whether
inadvertent failure to give the prescribed information can also be regarded as
a "deception."' 1 5 It is submitted that the answer must be in the affirmative.
after cited Miiller-Sax (KMR)J § 252, comm. 1-6 (6th ed. 1966), collecting cases and
citing authorities.
139. 14 BGHSt 358, 364 (1960).
140. C.C.P. § 136a(3); see 5 BGHSt 333; 11 BGHSt 211.
141. C.C.P. §§ 136, 163, 163a.
142. For a collection of cases under § 136a, C.C.P., see Miller-Sax (KMR) § 136a,
comm. 1-7; Schwartz-Kleinknecht, Strafprozessordnung [hereinafter cited Schwarz-Kieinknechtl § 136a, comm. 1-6 (26th ed. 1966).
143. C.C.P. §§ 136, 163a(3), (4), 243(3). Counsel is appointed by the court in every
case involving a serious misdemeanor or a felony; C.C.P. §§ 140-46.
144. See Schwarz-leinknecht § 136, comm. 11; Miller-Sax (KMR) § 136, comm. 2;
Dahs, 1965 NJ.W. 1266; 1 Lbwe-Rosenberg § 136, comm. 14; Miincheberg, Unzul]ssige
Tiuschung durch Organe der Strafverfolgungbehbrden 36 (Diss. Miinster 1966).
145. Under English law, inadvertant or otherwise excusable failure to comply with
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The result for the accused is the same as if the omission had been deliberate
since his lack of understanding of the situation and of his rights is the same in
either case. And it is from this result that section 136a is intended to protect
the subject, no matter how it came about. Furthermore, if this consequence
were denied, the escape into the pretext of mere inattentiveness would be made
too easy. Once this interpretation of section 136a(1) is accepted, the absolute
exclusion of any statement obtained after failure to inform the suspect of his
rights provided for by sections 136, 163a(3), (4) and 243(3), follows from the
express language in section 136a(3).
Under section 55 every witness may refuse to give information in regard
to questions the answers to which would place him or any of the relatives
designated in section 52 (1) in danger of criminal prosecution. The witness, too,
has to be informed of this right before he is interrogated by any judge or law
146
enforcement officer.
(3) Sections 94 et seq. contain detailed provisions with respect to the permissibility and the requirements, such as a judicial search warrant, of search
and seizure. Many, but not all violations of these very detailed and complicated provisions result in the inadmissibility of evidence thus obtained. 147 For
example, many objects and documents listed in section 97 as not subject to
seizure are inadmissible as demonstrative or documentary evidence. This field
is still very controversial and will also be the subject of the discussions of the
upcoming JURISTENTAG. The doctrine of the inadmissibility of the "fruit of
48
the poisonous tree" has so far been rejected by most of the courts.
The absence of exclusionary rules of probative policy in the codes that
were created after the 1848 Revolution could partly be explained by the political
situation and the precipitate haste with which they were drafted. Their absence
in the Code of Criminal Procedure for the Reich of February 1, 1877 was rather
the result of the high esteem in which the legislature held jurors, career judges
and lay judges. The reason for the replacement of the jury system by the
lay judge system in 1924 was the belief that the ends of lay participation
in the administration of criminal justice could be served better by a free
flow of communication between career judges and lay judges in the deliberation
room, than by a "separation of the benches." But the capacity of jurors, career
judges and lay judges for unbiased and responsible fact-finding has indeed never
been seriously questioned since the latter part of the nineteenth century. Thus, the
principle that Morgan and Maguire 149 proclaimed should govern the law of
evidence, (1) that nothing is to be received which is not logically probative of
some matter requiring to be proved; and (2), that everything which is thus
the Judges' Rules will not result in the exclusion of evidence obtained through that failure;
see Devlin, The Criminal Prosecution in England 45 (1958); Fellman, The Defendant's
Rights Under English Law 36 et seq. (1966).

146. C.C.P. §§ 55(2), 163a(5).
147. See Miller-Sax (KMR), comm. 6 preceding § 94, comm. 2 preceding § 48.

148. See Sender, Verwertung rechtswidrig erlangter Beweismittel 37 (1956).
149. Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 909 (1937).
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probative should come in, unless a clear ground of policy or law excludes it,
has been followed throughout. But the grounds of policy for the exclusion are
located entirely in other areas than in the consideration for the frailty of the factfinder's mind.
Even though there are no equivalents to the hearsay rule,1 0° the opinion
rule or the character rules that call for the exclusion of any relevant evidence
falling within their scope, this does not mean that hearsay, opinion or character
evidence, though admissible in principle, may be used as bases for a conviction
where better evidence is available.' 51 On the contrary, the clarifying duty of
the judge as stated in section 244(2), C.C.P., requires him to adduce on his
own motion the accessible better evidence that shines through the second best
evidence. Where the trial court failed to fulfill this clarifying duty, or where
it failed to explain convincingly in its written opinion why it relied on second
best evidence, the judgment is invariably subject to a reversal on appeal for
violation of section 244(2). 152 Similarly, the rule as to prior convictions of the
accused is not, as in Anglo-American law, one of exclusion in principle, with
exceptions for certain groups of cases, 153 but a more flexible one of admissibility
under the condition that it is "relevant for the decision."' 0 4 As to opinion evidence, the superiority of a statement of fact to a declaration of opinion is
certainly recognized, but it is also recognized that the opinion which a witness
or an expert witness has formed on certain facts of his narration or report in
court is also a relevant fact which the court may be well advised to take into
consideration. The enormous difficulties that the hypothetical question put to
expert witnesses has created under American evidence law'0 0 have been avoided,
in German evidence law, by the following procedure: 1 after hearing all evidence
on the controversial facts that the expert witness has not observed himself but
that are relevant for the expert opinion, the court deliberates, assesses the facts
it believes to be true, and orders the expert witness-in open court-to base his
opinion on these facts. Surprisingly, the question has not been posed 1 7 whether
under American procedural law a similar result could be reached by making the
assessment of the controversial facts the object of a special verdict or a fact
verdict. 58 The reason seems to be that only "ultimate facts" but not "evidentiary facts" can be submitted to the jury for a special verdict.
150. With the exceptions mentioned supra, p. 142.
151. For instance, the eye-witness of an event referred to by a hearsay witness.
152. See notes 103 and 110, supra.
153. See pages 140-41, supra.
154. C.C.P. § 243(4).
155. The "practical incubus" that "has in practice led to intolerable obstruction of
truth"; 2 Wigmore § 686. Uniform Rule of Evidence 58 has abandoned the requirement of
hypothetical presentation.
156. Jessnitzer, Der gerichtiche Sachverstindige 79, 81 (1963) (citing pertinent cases).
157. See 5 Moore, Federal Practice §§ 49.01-49.06.
158. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 49.
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D. Judge's Power of Discretion Over Reception of Evidence
In German evidence law, in short, exclusionary rules of probative policy
are not considered to be a central problem connected with the power of the
trier of fact to evaluate freely-that is, without weight regulations-the evidence
put before him. Therefore I do not want to elaborate on this question but
rather to proceed to a problem and an ensuing group of rules in German criminal
evidence law that are as germane to the particular position of the judge as the
trier of facts as the exclusionary rules of probative policy are germane to the
institution of the jury.
To realize the special character of the career judge's position after the
turning-point of German criminal procedure in the post-Revolutionary years
between 1848 and 1851 we have to remember that the career judge, in jury as
well as in non-jury cases, was no longer at once prosecutor, fact-finder and decision-maker. But the career judge still conducted the trial proper in the sense
that he examined the witnesses before the parties were allowed to ask additional
questions and that he could call witnesses and adduce other evidence on his own
motion. The judge's function as an impartial elicitor of exonerating as well as
incriminating facts was thought to be the greatest safeguard against partisan
distortion and partial suppression of relevant facts by zealous adversaries. 159
It is still believed to "prevent degeneration of the trial into a kind of duel where
160
guilt or innocence of the defendant is at stake."'
But it was from this high-minded faith of the legislature in the judge and
from a misunderstanding of the new principle of free evaluation of the evidence
that a very serious problem arose, a problem which was solved, after a long
struggle, not by the legislature but by a body of judge-made rules of evidence.
The problem was this: If the judge' 61 was to determine according to the
best of his belief as to the way of finding the truth, how far the reception of
evidence should be extended, how could either of the parties get in that evidence
which the judge or the panel of judges had overlooked or refused to take when
asked by the party? In other words, was the judge to be the sole master of the
proceedings, or were the parties to influence the scope of the proof-taking
process?
The final government draft of the Code of Criminal Procedure, submitted
to the Reichstag in 1874,1 62 gave a radical answer, using a radical argument.
Both parties, it is true, were granted the right to file a motion, before
159. For a vivid and impressive description of a somewhat ideal but on the whole
typical conduct of a trial along these lines in a German Schwurgericht in the 1950's, see
Bedford, The Faces of Justice 101 (1961).
160. Eb, Schmidt, Introduction to the English translation of the C.C.P., in 10 American Series of Foreign Penal Codes, Germany, at 16 (1965).
161. In cases under the original jury system (abolished in 1924), the judge alone
made these decisions regarding the scope of the evidence, without the participation of the
jury. Today, the lay judges have a full vote in these matters; see note 177, infra.
162. 1 Hahn, Die gesamten Materialien zur Strafprozessordnung [hereinafter cited
Hahn] 4-296 (1880).
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the triaZ, that certain relevant evidence of their choice be taken (the state
attorney had this right in addition to his obligation to list all evidence in the
charge sheet). The accused was even allowed to have witnesses and expert
witnesses summoned if he advanced the expenses. But the judge or the panel
of judges (without the participation of the jury in jury cases) was to have
unfettered discretion as to whether these persons were finally examined in court
or not. The draft provided in its section 207: "The extent to which evidence is
received shall be determined by the court. The court is not bound in its determination by motions, former conclusions, or waivers."
And the "motifs" for the draft made it entirely clear that this absolute
power of the judge to determine the scope of the reception of evidence was to
extend to each and every situation, even to witnesses summoned at the de163
fendant's expense.
The arguments to justify this radical answer were no less radical:
The denial of a motion to receive evidence implies the statement
of the court that the proffered evidence, even if it confirmed the
contention of the proponent, would have no influence upon the judicial
conviction as to guilt or innocence of the defendant. The denial of
such a motion is therefore in a sense already a constituent part of the
final verdict.
Therefore, the argument ran on, it was only proper for those who had to pass
the final verdict to anticipate this constituent part of it.
Of course, this argument failed to fit into the pattern of the jury court,
shaped after the Anglo-American model, that was (ever since 1848) to have
jurisdiction over the most serious felonies. There it was the jury that passed
the verdict but the panel of three career judges was to pass upon evidence
motions. The conflict was solved by a rhetorical trick: the judges, it was said,
represented the jury in this respect, and this distribution of function was
necessary for reasons of expediency.
As a result of the violent attacks that liberal parliamentarians launched
at this draft, 6 4 a compromise was finally reached in section 244, C.C.P. 1 5
It was made the court's inevitable duty to hear witnesses and expert witnesses
that had been summoned by either party and that had appeared in court at the
trial. This principle was inapplicable only in cases that were subject to full
de novo trial on appeal (that is, cases before the Sch~ffengericht) and to the
de novo appellate trial of petty offenses. In these groups of cases the scope
of the reception of evidence was left entirely to the discretion of the judge, in
accordance with the government draft. 106
163. 1 Hahn 192, 193.
164. 1 Hahn 849, 852; 2 Hahn 1185 passim, 1315 passim, 1634.
165. The original code provision has been changed many times; see hifra, p. 156.
166. These provisions applied only where the party had been denied a pre-trial

motion to receive certain evidence and where the party had then summoned the witness
or expert witness or produced the other evidence himself and at his own expense.
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As to the situation at the trial proper, when, on the basis of evidence
produced so far, either party wanted the court to receive additional evidence
not moved for by a pre-trial motion, the 1877 Code was reticent. But on the
other hand, section 207 of the draft had also disappeared. The legislative
materials do not satisfactorily answer the question whether all this was due to
negligent drafting or whether it was the deliberate result of the struggle between
the state governments and the liberal legislators working together in a special
committee of the Reichstag.
Anyhow, in the first few years following the promulgation of the code, it
was a common belief among judges and writers' 6 7 that outside the range of
section 244 (relating to evidence produced by pre-trial party activity) the
court was entirely free to determine the extent to which evidence was to be
received. The rationale given for this view was that the judge's complete freedom in the evaluation of the admitted evidence necessarily presupposed his
freedom to receive only the evidence he thought necessary and to stop receiving
evidence when, on the basis of the evidence heard so far, he had reached a
certain result as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Since the only
requirement for the conviction was that the judge (or a majority of judges)
was thoroughly convinced, what more could be achieved once he was?
This reasoning is based on a confusion of the principle of evaluation and
the object evaluated: the code itself, in its section 261, defines the object of the
free evaluation as the "result of the reception of evidence."'1 68 The freedom to
evaluate the evidence that was produced at the trial has nothing whatsoever to
do with the question of discretion or lack of discretion as to the scope and
mode of the reception of the evidence. Logically the evaluation comes into play
only after the evidence has been produced. The statement that the evaluation
is free does not, however, tell us anything about the nature of the proceedings
in which the evidence is produced. But curiously enough, evidence scholars have
again and again fallaciously assumed that it does. Thus, Arthur Lenhoff' 69 explains the comparative dearth of admissibility rules in Continental evidence law
as being attributable to the unfettered discretion enjoyed by the judge in
evaluating the evidence. The same fallacy underlies the writings of some German
scholars who regard the emergence of the evidence rules that we are going to
discuss shortly 70 as an encroachment on the principle of free evaluation of
evidence.' 7 ' A French writer, Rached, comes to the same conclusion: "La
libert6 du juge dans l'admission des preuves est une consequence logique de
167. See Klee, Die Bestimmung des Umfangs der ]Beweisaufnahme im Strafverfahren
102-31 (1937); Ditzen, Dreierlei Beweis im Strafverfahren 16-35 (1926).
168. "das Ergebnis der Beweisaufnahme." See supra, p. 148.
169. Lenhoff, The Law of Evidence-A Comparative Study Based Essentially on
Austrian and New York Law, 3 Am. J. Comp. L. 313, 335 (1954).

170. Infra, pp. 157-60.
171.

Lbwe-Rosenberg § 244, comm. 12; Karl Peters, FreieBeweiswiirdigung und Justiz532, 548 (1965); Sarstedt 164; SchwarzKleinknecht § 261, comm. 4; Wimmer, 1950 Deutsche Rechts-Zeitschrift 394.
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la preuve morale."' 172 Furthermore, as the careful comparative study by Elisabeth Kreuzer 173 indicates, the prevailing opinion in Italian and, to a somewhat
lesser degree, in French criminal evidence law is still that, by virtue of his
freedom in the evaluation, the judge may reject evidence offered by the parties.
E. Inadmissible Evidence
This was also the view taken by the German courts immediately after the
C.C.P. had become effective on October 1, 1879. The German Reichsgericht,
in a few decisions early in 1880, confirmed some lower court decisions arguing
along those lines.' 74 But as early as February 6, 1880, the Reichsgericht began
to oppose that argument by ruling that to pre-judge the value of evidence
offered by the defendant before the evidence had ever been received constituted
an improper limitation of the defense. A few years later the court developed
the broader theory (applicable also to motions of the prosecution) that "anticipated evaluation of the evidence" was not permissible if the evidence offered
was relevant and not in itself inadmissible. 75 This was the recognition of the
right of the parties to the reception of relevant evidence that the judge refused
to receive because on the basis of the evidence he had heard he had already
formed his opinion. The recognition of this Beweiserhebungsansprucl became
the basis for the spinning out, over the years, of a most elaborate system of rules
with respect to the admission and exclusion of relevant evidence offered by either
of the parties. When, in 1930, Max Alsberg wrote his path-breaking essay Der
Beweisantrag im Straiprozess, he systematized more than twelve hundred
decisions of the Reichsgericht and the state high courts dealing with this question. These decisions revealed an underlying assumption that, irrespective of
the trial court's own opinion, it had to receive each and every evidence moved
for by either party, provided only that it was relevant to the issue and sufficiently specified, and that the trial court could refuse to receive evidence only
in some exceptional groups of cases. These exceptions, as defined by the
Reichsgericht, were finally adopted wholesale by the legislature. I cannot here
discuss the details of this incorporation process that went forward and backward
in several steps and finally led to the present formulation of sections 244,
245, C.C.P., by the Act For the Restoration of Uniformity of Law, of
September 12, 1950.176 Suffice it to list and to discuss in brief the pertinent
172.

Rachel, De l'intime conviction du juge 179 (1942).

173. Elisabeth Kreuzer, Die Bestimmung des Umfangs der Beweisaufnahme im
deutschen, franziisischen und italienischen Strafprozess 77-186 (1964).

174. See Klee, op. cit. supra note 166, at 102.
175. For the history of this development, see Klee, supra; for the result see AlsbergNiise, beginning at page 61.

In American evidence law, the judge performs such an anticipated evaluation when,
e.g., he excludes evidence because in his opinion it would unduly prejudice the jury sitting
before him. See Note, 70 Yale L.J. 763, 771-74 (1961). He anticipates the influence of the
proffered evidence on the jury in the same way that the German judge was trusted to be
able to anticipate the influence of the proffered evidence on his own mind.
176.

1950 Bundesgesetzblatt (pt. I) 455, 515.
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groups of cases in which the court 177 may reject evidence proffered by either
178
party.
(1) A motion to receive evidence must be denied if the evidence offered
is in itself inadmissible. As to instances of inadmissible evidence, I refer to the
survey given above 179 on exclusionary rules of extrinsic policy. Two more
examples of inadmissible evidence are the testimony of a psychiatrist or psychologist as to the trustworthiness of a witness whom he has examined, if the witness
himself or his legal representative have not given their valid consent to the
examination, 80 and, secondly, the production of a tape recording if the speaker
had not consented to the recording. 181
It goes without saying that in all these cases of inadmissibility of the
evidence not only can the parties not move for its introduction but the court,
too, may not introduce such evidence on its own motion.
(2) A motion to receive evidence may be denied:
(a) if the allegation to be proved concerns a matter of common knowledge
or judicial notice. In this latter case it has to be announced in open court if
judicial notice is to be taken so that the parties can discuss the matter; 182
(b) if the fact to be proved is of no importance for the decision; this is
largely congruent with the familiar Anglo-American notions of irrelevancy and
immateriality183 so that no further discussion seems necessary here;
(c) if the fact to be proved has already been proved. In this case the
court has to notify the proponent (if necessary, after a deliberation on this
point) that the truth of the allegation will be regarded as established. Of
course, the court must not deviate from this point of view in its final judgment.
This is a suitable device for the parties to test the court's attitudes to certain
issues and to pin the court down to a certain attitude; 8 4
(d) if the proof offered is completely unsuitable because it is inherently
incapable of furthering the exploration of the truth. 8 5 For instance, a mere
witness is completely unsuitable where expert knowledge and expert conclusions
are required to determine an issue. 8 6 Likewise, the opinion of an expert witness
is completely unsuitable proof if it is impossible to furnish him with the factual
data on which the desired inference could be based.1 87 The driving test offered
177. The lay judges now do fully participate in the deliberation and have a full vote
in the decisions on the pertinent motions.

178. C.C.P. § 244(3), (4).
179. At page 149.
180. State v. H., Bundesgerichtshof (II. Strafsenat), 11 November 1959, 14 BGHSt
21, 23.
181. State v. A., Bundesgerichtshof (I. Strafsenat), 14 June 1960, 14 BGHSt 358;
see Lbwe-Rosenberg § 244 comm. 27; Alsberg-Niise 89.
182. Judgment of Bundesverfassungsgericht (I. Senat), 3 November 1959, 1960
Monatsschrift fir Deutsches Recht 24.
183. See Lbwe-Rosenberg § 244, comm. 28; Alsberg-Nse 66.
184. Alsberg-Ndse 146 passim.
185. L~we-Rosenberg § 244, comm. 30; Alsberg-Niise 207.
186. Judgment of Bundesgerichtshof (IV. Strafsenat), 6 October 1961, 21 Verkehrsrechtssammlung [hereinafter cited VRSI 429.
187. State v. B., Bundesgerichtshof (I. Strafsenat), 14 June 1960, 14 BGHSt 339, 342.
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by a vehicle driver who admits having operated a car with a blood-alcohol
concentration of .2% to prove that he is capable of safe driving in spite of that
intoxication is completely unsuitable proof, since it is established by scientific
research that beyond a blood-alcohol concentration of .15% no driver can drive
safely."' Since this ground to reject evidence constitutes an exception from the
general prohibition against the "anticipated evaluation of evidence," strictest
standards, as indicated by the examples given above, have to be applied; 180
(e) if the'evidence offered is beyond reach, e.g., the witness has gone
abroad and his present domicile is unknown;
(f) if a material allegation which is to be proved for the exoneration of
the defendant may be treated as though the alleged fact were true. 00 This
taking for granted (Wakrunterstellung) of an exonerating allegation of the
defendant has the same effect as if the allegation had been proved. Since the
court has the obligation to extend sua sponte the reception of the evidence to
all facts and to all means of proof which are important for the decision,' 0 ' the
court must not resort to this substitute of proof before it is satisfied that a
clarification of the issue is impossible, so that the defendant has to be granted
the benefit of the doubt. 92 Here is an illustrative example: 93 defendant is
charged with the murder in the first degree of his wife. He invokes as a mitigating
circumstance provocation by the victim and moves for the reception of the
testimony of his neighbors who, he alleges, will testify that they heard a violent
altercation shortly before the time the killing occurred. Here the court may
argue: if the neighbors confirmed this allegation it might have to be taken as
established (if the neighbors are trustworthy). If they denied having heard
anything the defendant still would be protected by the benefit of the doubt
because that testimony would not permit an inference either way. Therefore the
allegation of the defendant might as well be treated as if it were true. In a case
like that, the time, cost and effort of receiving the profferred evidence may be
saved. Of course, the court must take as established the allegation that it
has, by rejecting the evidence for it, promised to treat as though it were proved.
In our case this means that mitigating circumstances have to be recognized
and given effect.
(3) In addition to the grounds listed above, a motion to receive evidence by examining an expert witness may also be denied:
(a) If the court itself possesses the necessary expert knowledge.'0 4 The
purported expert knowledge must be carefully displayed in the written statement of grounds for the judgment.195 This requirement, which is enforced with
188.

State v. W., Bundesgerichtshof (IV. Strafsenat), 11 April 1957, 10 BGHSt 265.

189.
190.

LMwe-Rosenberg § 244, comm. 30.
Id., comm. 29(c); Alsberg-Niise 146.

191.

C.C.P. § 244(2).

192.
193.
194.
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judgment of Bundesgerichtshof (IV. Strafsenat), 14 July 1961, 1961 N.J.W. 2069.
Lbwe-Rosenberg § 244, comm. 29(c).
Id., comm. 31-33; Alsberg-Niise 237.
Sarstedt 176, 177; Alsberg-Niise 256 n.30 (citing cases).
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great strictness by the appellate courts, naturally tends to deter a trial court
from claiming any such expertise unless it is prepared to render a full-fledged
expert opinion. In practice, this has led to a very cautious self-restraint of trial
courts.
(b) The hearing of a further expert can also be denied if the contrary of
the alleged fact has already been proved by the prior expert opinion; this does
not apply if the expert knowledge of the prior expert is doubtful, if his opinion
is based on incorrect factual premises, if the opinion contains contradictions
or if the new expert has means of research at his disposal which appear superior
to those of a prior expert. 196
(4) The only motion the denial of which is in the discretion of the court
97
is the motion to take a view.'
(5) If the defendant, instead of moving for its adduction by the court,
adduces the evidence himself, that is, subpoenas witnesses or expert witnesses
99
at his expense' 98 or produces real evidence or documents, the court is'
practically never entitled to reject the evidence thus offered and presented but it
has to receive it.200 This is the most powerful weapon of the defendant to
introduce any admissible and relevant evidence he wants. 211 It gives the modern
German criminal procedure a very strong adversary feature but has, not unlike
the American adversary system, a tendency to favor the defendant of means who
can afford to adduce, e.g., a host of expert witnesses testifying on his behalf.
(6) Theoretically, the court may reject any motion to receive evidence
and refuse to receive any evidence adduced by the defendant under section 245
if the sole motive of the motion or the production was to delay the proceedings
and thereby to abuse the right to introduce evidence. 20 2 Practically, a refusal
to receive evidence under this provision is extremely rare, since proof that sole
intention was to delay the proceedings is hardly ever possible, and since a
legitimate purpose is presumed by the law on the part of an attorney-at-law. 203
Thus the commentaries on the C.C.P. list only a handful of cases where the
rejection of evidence on this ground was upheld by the appellate courts. A
typical case is that decided by the Federal Supreme Court on December 11,
1953:204 defense counsel wanted to "prove," by a motion to receive evidence,
an allegation of the defendant which counsel himself expressly declared to disbelieve. The situation would have been entirely different if the defendant him196.
197.
198.
199.

Liiwe-Rosenberg § 244, comm. 34; Alsberg-Niise 256 et seq.
C.C.P. § 244(5).
C.C.P. §§ 219, 220.
Subject only to the exception discussed in II (6) herein.

200. C.C.P. § 245.
201. See Alsberg-Niise 488 passim.
202. Id. at 30-75.

203. Ldwe-Rosenberg § 244, comm. 27(b); MUller-Sax (KMR) § 244, comm. 15

(citing cases).
204. Judgment of Bundesgerichtshof (I. Strafsenat), BGH 1 StR 284/53 (unpublished;
cited by MUller-Sax (KMR) § 244, comm. 15).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
self had put forward that motion, which he would have been entitled to do
independently.
(7) Belatedness of a proffer of evidence alone is never a reason for its
rejection, as expressly stated in section 246, C.C.P.
(8) Section 244(6) and section 34, C.C.P., require a specific court order
with detailed reasons if a motion to receive evidence is denied so that the party
moving for the reception of the evidence may adapt its further trial tactics to
the rejection.
Every denial of a motion to receive evidence is subject to appellate review,20' and high court decisions dealing with these questions fill many a volume.
F. The Court's Duty of Clarification
By a motion to receive evidence which cannot be rejected under sections
244 and 245, C.C.P., the court (especially the presiding judge who conducts
the proceedings and prepares for it by studying the files and dossiers and, on
that basis, works out a preliminary scheme of the scope and mode of the trial)
is forced to receive evidence which it thought unnecessary to receive on its own
motion. Since the grounds for the denial of such a motion are very limited, as
we have seen, it is obvious that as far as the scope of the reception of evidence
is concerned-and this is of course the core of the criminal procedure-it is the
parties, and not the judge who are, at least potentially, "masters of the trial,"
that is, if they exercise their rights.
But what if they do not? What if, for instance, the defendant has a poor
attorney or no attorney at all? 20 6 In this situation, the old notion of the judge's
impartiality as the guarantee of the exploration of the truth-a notion that the
necessity of the provisions in section 244-245, C.C.P., proved to need some
qualifications-has been forged into another sharp weapon for the defendant to
enforce the court's obligation to become active on his behalf. This is the device
of the Aufkldrungsrige. This device was first developed by the Reichsgericht
only thirty-five years ago. It is now the most frequently used attack against convictions, though the code itself does not even use the word or a similar language,
and though, according to one writer, the device in its present shape cannot even
20 7
be deduced from other provisions of the code as it stands today.
What it this device? By the Aufkldrungsriige the convicted defendant
claims that the court was thoroughly convinced of the incriminating fact A but
that it arrived at that result in violation of its clarifying duty.2 08 The court,
it is claimed, violated its duty by not receiving, on its own motion, further
evidence possibly favorable to the defendant of which there were strong indica205. See Alsberg-Niise 433.
206. Apart from minor trials for petty offenses, the court has to assign a lawyer
where the defendant has not retained counsel, and failure to do so leads to reversal on
appeal. See C.C.P. §§ 140-146.
207. Sarstedt 162, 168.
208.

C.C.P. § 244(2) (c).
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tions in the facts established so far, the dossiers, or, simply in fair reasoning.
This evidence, if received, would have tended to establish the court's conviction of fact B or fact non-A, or at least to shake its conviction of fact A.
In other words, the defendant claims that the court did reach an intime conviction of the defendant's guilt but reached it on a factual basis that should
not have used, and that, therefore, the court has reached its conviction unlawfully. This attack is launched after the trial, and it is only the appellate court
that may grant relief by stating that section 244(2), C.C.P., was violated and
by remanding the case for new trial. Whereas in the case of the unlawful rejection of a motion to receive evidence the trial court was first formally asked
to act by the party filing the motion, no such requirement is necessary to launch
the Aufklirungsriige. Here the defendant need only point out-and this must
be done in some detail in the motion that he files with the appellate court-that
the trial court neglected to do its duty of all-round clarification, which exists
even if the defendant or defense counsel do not open their mouths. The defendant
or defense counsel thereby become a kind of supervisor of the trial court's
official function to clarify the facts. In other words, by the Aufklirungsrige
the defendant can, in principle, reach the very same results as by a motion to
receive evidence: he can force the court to hear further evidence, even if the
court is already convinced of the defendant's guilt but realizes-or ought to
realize-that a situation exists which, if gone into more deeply, might shake
that conviction. As a matter of fact, it has been pointed out that by a motion
to receive evidence the party does nothing but call the court's attention to its
20 9
clarifying function.
In practice, the situation is somewhat different. The standards applied by
the appellate courts to the trial court's obligation to adduce evidence in favor
of the defendant on its own motion are, of necessity, based on the trial court's
more limited access to the facts of the case, compared with the defendant himself and defense counsel.2 10 So while practically every offer of evidence by the
defendant (and by the state attorney, for that matter) must be accepted as
long as the evidence offered is relevant, the Aufkldrungsrige is successful only
if it can be pointed out that there was some indication, accessible to the court,
of the existence of the exonerating evidence. Such indications can be furnished
(and it can be argued that the trial court should have followed them) by the
results of the evidence heard so far, by the contents of the dossiers, by suggestions from the defendant or defense counsel, suggestions not containing the
specificity of a formal motion to receive evidence, or by simple reasoning, e.g.,
that the case might be clarified in a way favorable to the defendant by calling
an expert witness. Failure of the trial court to appoint an expert witness on
its own motion to exonerate the defendant has thus become the most frequently
209. Beling, Note, 1925 Juristiche Wochenschrift 2782.
210. See Sarstedt 169.
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used hook on which to hang a successful Aufkldrungsrige.2 1 Here are two
typical examples:
(1) Failure to appoint an additional expert to explain a discrepancy between the results, testified to respectively by other experts, of a blood-alcohol
212
concentration examination and a clinical examination of the defendant.
(2) Failure to appoint an additional hand-writing expert after one expert
had testified that a signature on a falsified document was performed by the
213
defendant.
The appellate court's reasoning in the second case is particularly interesting: Here the trial court had denied, under section 244(4), C.C.P., a formal
motion by the defense to appoint a further expert. The appellate court, while
conceding that the denial was perfectly justified under that provision, proceeded
to state that the trial court's obligation to clarify the facts may even exceed its
duty to receive evidence moved for by the defendant. The judgement was therefore reversed for failure of the trial court to appoint a further expert on its own
motion.
This makes it clear that the Aufklrungsrige has outgrown its original
role of serving as a substitute for the rules regulating the court's duty to receive
evidence on the motion of a party, when those rules were repealed by the
214
Nazi legislature.
It is clear that the rules regarding a party's motion to receive evidence
and the Aujkldrungsriige reflect a notion of the fact-finder's mind that is
totally different from the notion underlying the government draft of 1874.216
What is left of the notion of the judge who, by virtue of his power to freely
evaluate the evidence produced in court, is also capable to pre-evaluate the
evidence not produced and to predict what influence it would have on his
"intime conviction," had it been produced? In short, what is left of the notion
of the judge who could be trusted with anticipatory evaluation of the evidence?
Hardly anything, to be sure. The mode and scope of the proof-taking process
is now regulated by a net of hard and fast rules that are binding on the trial
court and leave no room whatsoever for the exercise of discretion. As a matter
of fact, the enforcement of these rules is guaranteed because every violation
of them constitutes reversible error. It is therefore only after the hearing of the
evidence is concluded and both parties have had an opportunity to present
their arguments and to comment freely on the evidence, that the judge's power
to follow his own personal "intime conviction" can come into play. However
this power, once so delimited, may be exercised without restriction by any
regulation or rules, except for the rules of logic and the laws of nature. There
211.
212.
213.
116.

Ldwe-Rosenberg § 244, comm. 11 (collecting numerous cases).
Judgment of Bundesgerichtshof (III. Strafsenat), 12 December 1953, 6 VRS 48.
State v. H., Bundesgerichtshof (II. Strafsenat), 19 November 1956, 10 BGHSt
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are no presumptions, no corroboration rules, no "legal proof" rules. The principle of free evaluation of the evidence, in short, has been reduced to its
proper dimensions.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Let us summarize the results of our observations and add some concluding
remarks:
The typical feature of the Anglo-American evidence law that distinguishes
it from the Continental system is the existence of exclusionary rules of probative
policy. These rules stem from the use of the jury trial and reflect varying and
conflicting notions of the jury's mental capacities that were now over-, and now
underrated on the basis of more or less unwarranted guesses and speculations.
The trend of the most recent development is to replace these guesses and dogmatic speculations by a more realistic view. In this connection, it should have
been pointed out in greater detail that a great deal of relaxation of, for instance,
the hearsay rule and the opinion rule, that is, the widening of the scope of
admissible evidence, is due to a growing confidence in the greater sophistication
of the modern jury. Moreover, great efforts are made to develop particular
rules of evidence for non-jury trials, rules which are shaped after the notion of
a trained fact-finder's mind.2 16 The adversary notion of the trial-the basic
safeguard for the discovery of the truth, and yet "one of the causes of the
failure of the jury to give satisfactory service" 217-is greatly mitigated by discovery devices, the imposition on the prosecution of the duty to divulge evidence
favorable to the accused, 218 and a growing tendency to strengthen the position
of the judge by giving him the power to appoint expert witnesses and, in his
discretion, to refrain from putting hypothetical questions to expert witnesses, 21 9
which devices may result finally in the elimination of the "battle of experts"
from th& courtroom.
On the other hand, the typical feature of German criminal evidence law
is the strong and active position of the judge, reflecting an enormous confidence
in his ability to be both active and impartial and to give every item of relevant
evidence the weight that it deserves. Some decades ago, we found confidence
in his ability to perform the superhuman task of assessing what weight ought
to be given to evidence that he had not even heard or seen. The trend of
modern development, as in American evidence law, is toward a more realistic
view, based on the experience that too great a confidence in the judge's capacity
to combine the roles of both the proponent and the evaluator of the evidence
may tend to generate prejudice on his part. Hence, the right of the parties to
216. Davis, An Approach to Rules of Evidence for Non-Jury Cases, So A.BA.J. 723
(1964); Love, The Applicability of the Rules of Evidence in Non-Jury Trials, 24 Rocky

Mt. L. Rev. 480 (1952); Note, Improper Evidence in Non-Jury Trials: Basis for Reversal?, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 407 (1965).
217. Morgan Foreword to the Model Code of Evidence, p. 10.
218. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1962).
219. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 28; Uniform Rules of Evidence 58, 59.
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move for the reception of evidence and to adduce evidence themselves, and the
granting of the Aufklirungsriige to the defendant, two devices designed to
compel the admission of relevant evidence that the judge originally thought
unnecessary. This has given to the modern German criminal procedure a marked
adversary character and at the same time has preserved the benefits of the
notion of the "active" judge, his activity in favor of the defendant being enforced by the threat of reversal of the judgment for failure to have been sufficiently active in that direction.
A common feature in the recent development in both evidence law systems
seems to be that ideological and dogmatic assumptions are replaced by more
realistic and commonsense views. The result is a tendency to introduce more
relevant evidence and to submit it to the trier of fact in a way that facilitates
its unbiased evaluation. Is our initial statement not justified, then, that the two
systems are approaching each other though the starting-points are far apart?

